Polish Presidential Elections: How Mainstreaming of the (Far) Right Continues [Analysis]
Less than a month before the first round of presidential elections in Poland, Rafał Trzaskowski, a candidate close to the ruling liberal-social-democrat coalition, leads the race with 28% support. He is followed by Karol Nawrocki, the candidate backed by sovereignists of Law and Justice, who holds 22%. Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right Confederation party comes third, polling at 15%. Szymon Hołownia of the centre-right Poland 2050 party trails behind them with 7% support. Adrian Zandberg of the social democratic Together party follows with 6%, while his former party colleague Magdalena Biejat, now representing the centre-left New Left, garners just 4%.
Yet one must ask: does a simple division of electoral percentages truly capture the underlying political reality in Poland?
Don’t be dismayed by the high support for the ‘progressive’ Rafał Trzaskowski or the supposedly liberal Szymon Hołownia – while the more hardcore right may seem weaker in the polls, their ideology is leaving a powerful mark on the campaign and on the programmes of nearly everyone in the race, the left-leaning candidates being the only exception.
The 2025 Polish presidential election is marked an unmistakable turn toward nationalism
— a development that transcends party boundaries and permeates nearly every corner of the political discourse. This nationalist shift, however, does not follow a single trajectory. Instead, it has manifested itself in two mutually reinforcing forms: cultural exclusion and economic individualism.
On the one hand, there is an increasingly explicit rhetoric of xenophobia and suspicion, especially toward migrants. What was once a moment of national pride — Poland’s open-armed response to Ukrainian refugees in 2022 — has given way to open hostility. The narrative has shifted: Ukrainians are no longer “guests in need” but alleged opportunists, accused of exploiting Polish hospitality. Political actors who previously emphasized humanitarian principles are now scrambling to appeal to a fearful and fatigued electorate. This applies to Rafał Trzaskowski too. Yes: Donald Tusk and his party, once vocal critics of the Law and Justice government’s repressive border policies, now boast about deportation numbers and pledge to shield Polish society from an undefined, foreign threat.
In recent days, this narrative has taken on a new form, with the liberal government stating that it is time to repolonise the Polish economy — until now, such concepts were the domain of the far right.
This shift is not confined to the political right. It has become mainstream.
Neoliberalism in Nationalist Clothing
While the cultural form of this nationalism is rooted in exclusion, its economic variant takes the shape of a renewed — and radicalized — neoliberalism. Most of the candidates, with the two exceptions on the left, have embraced what can only be described as a deregulated vision of the state. Calls for low taxes have been repeated like mantras, up to proposals to constitutionally ban certain forms of taxation altogether. What we are witnessing is neoliberalism unrestrained — stripped even of the modest social interests that once characterized Polish economic discourse.
The effect of that was seen in April, when the majority of the Tusk’s government, except the New Left, voted for lowering health insurance contributions for entrepreneurs. The simple majority was possible thanks to the abstention of the far-right Confederation. This means that full-time employees, who earn less on average, will pay higher contributions than entrepreneurs. The cost of this? PLN 4.6 billion, or just over EUR 1 billion. All this at a time when the public health system is struggling with a budget deficit of around PLN 20 billion, or around EUR 5 billion. A deficit that is growing month by month. Now, the bill is awaiting the president’s signature and Senate’s approval.
In this context, both the Law and Justice’s model of “social-faced nationalism” and the Civic Coalition’s intermittent gestures toward housing as a public good have disappeared from the debate. The policy space has narrowed to a point where redistributive or solidaristic proposals are viewed as electoral liabilities.
The Radicalisation of the Center
Some authors attribute it to an amoral, individualistic turn — one resembling the thesis of Edward C. Banfield from his famous book The Moral Basis of a Backward Society — stating that such turns are common in the situations of prolonged crisis and general uncertainty. While others add vigilantly that such a turn would be impossible if the Polish state fulfilled its promises in terms of healthcare, education and general social policy.
At the same time others point out that this nationalist and individualist shift is not simply a reaction to external events. It is the result of structural failures within the political system — particularly on the part of the democratic opposition. For years, the Polish right has not only dominated the political narrative but also systematically dismantled the legitimacy of alternative platforms. The opposition, instead of developing its own communicative tools, ceded space — both rhetorical and institutional. The cost of that passivity is now evident.
The complete surrender of the Polish post-communist left, described in a truly masterful way by Maria Snegovaya in her book When the Left Moves Right, ended up with the left no longer existing today in a meaningful way, and left-wing economic ideas enjoying the support of only a few percent of the population – apart from pro-social measures in the form of benefits, which enjoy strong support, but not for ‘outsiders’.
At the same time, the protest movements in Poland were crushed or ostensibly ignored, and the trade unions suffer from an extremely restrictive laws limiting the actions they could take and making organisation of protests really challenging. As my colleague, Małgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat, commented: A generation of voters, raised in a climate of political resignation and atomized interest, has internalized the lesson that collective action is futile. They see no incentive to engage with systems that ignore them. Today, this generation shapes the political landscape — not through protests or reformist energy, but through a hardened belief in self-preservation.
From Solidarity to Scapegoating
Among the most alarming developments of the campaign is the degree to which anti-immigrant narratives have targeted Ukrainian refugees. The language once reserved for fringe voices has entered the mainstream. For a brief but telling period, nearly every major political force, except for the Left and Poland 2050, adopted positions indistinguishable from those of the far-right Confederation party — a group known for its ultranationalist and pro-Russian stance.
One of the more prominent proposals, supported implicitly or explicitly by multiple candidates, is to restrict the 800+ child benefit program by excluding unemployed Ukrainians. This proposal is not only discriminatory but factually unfounded. The benefit is already conditional on school attendance and having a legal residency title. The money is never transferred abroad, nor is it exploited by foreign beneficiaries en masse.
Contrary to the far right propaganda, approximately 80% of Ukrainian refugees in Poland are employed. Others are either seeking employment or work informally due to administrative barriers (and dishonesty of the employers). These are the highest rates of labour market integration among refugee populations in the European Union. Nonetheless, the political utility of the scapegoat has proven irresistible.
Political Calculus
This narrative shift is not driven solely by ideology. It reflects a calculated political response to evolving public sentiment. Three years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, fatigue has set in. The emotional solidarity that defined early 2022 has eroded. A recent poll by the Mieroszewski Centre illustrates the change: only 25% of respondents express a positive view of Ukrainians, while 30% hold a negative one. The largest group — 41% — remain neutral. But the trajectory is clear. Sentiment is cooling, and political actors are adjusting accordingly.
The implications of this shift are profound. Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric not only damages bilateral relations and undermines regional stability but also obstructs the long-term integration of refugees — a policy failure that will have social, economic, and demographic consequences for years to come.
Institutional Illusions
In contrast to the toxicity of the migration debate, Poland’s economic outlook has been surprisingly positive. In 2024, real wages increased by 9.5% — the fastest pace since the early years of the post-communist transformation. This growth, driven by statutory increases to the minimum wage and significant raises in the public sector, served as a form of delayed compensation for the inflation shock of 2023, which had briefly exceeded 18%.
Poland’s GDP growth — approximately 3% — placed it near the top of EU rankings for 2024, and forecasts for 2025 remain similarly optimistic. Yet these facts have not led to a more constructive or nuanced economic debate. On the contrary, candidates from across the political spectrum have treated the economy as a stage for posturing rather than policymaking.
What makes this even more paradoxical is that the Polish president has only limited influence over economic policy. While the office has the power of legislative initiative and veto, fiscal decisions are made by parliament and executed by the government. Still, presidential candidates continue to campaign on economic visions that far exceed their institutional remit.
In part, this is due to public misunderstanding. Many voters simply do not grasp the limits of presidential authority. But there is a deeper reason: Polish presidential elections are not just contests of personality. They have turned into referenda on the kind of state people want to live in — including its economic character.
A Legal System Under Stress
Beyond political rhetoric and campaign slogans, a more serious threat looms: the potential invalidation of the election results. In a context where electoral victories are decided by narrow margins, even minor irregularities carry significant weight. In recent years, both presidential and parliamentary elections in Poland have hinged on small vote differentials. This fragility makes the system vulnerable to legal and procedural contestation.
More concerning is the broader legitimacy crisis that underpins this risk. For over a decade, Poland has been locked in a political and constitutional standoff. Competing parties no longer recognize each other’s legitimacy. Institutions are not seen as neutral arbiters but as instruments of partisan warfare. The consequences have been corrosive: the Constitutional Tribunal has lost its credibility, and the ordinary judiciary has been politicized.
Against this backdrop, the electoral process itself is now at risk. One plausible scenario is already being floated: should Rafał Trzaskowski narrowly defeat his PiS-backed opponent, supporters of the losing side may file formal challenges with the Supreme Court. Their argument? That the ruling coalition, by withholding public subsidies from the opposition, distorted the electoral playing field.
These funds — amounting to tens of millions of złotys — would have bolstered PiS’s campaign infrastructure. If the court rules the election invalid, and the ruling coalition refuses to accept that verdict, the crisis could deepen. At that point, Poland would face not just a contested election, but a constitutional rupture.
Karol Nawrocki in a meeting with his sympathizers in Bielsko-Biała, Southern Poland, 2024. At similar occasions, it has been frequently hinted that should the ‘patriotic’ candidate not win, it may be the result of ‘anti-Polish’ Tusk’s machinations. There were even comparisons to the situation in Romania when the candidate who won the first round was then removed from the presidential race (and the Polish right prefers not to elaborate why). Photo source.
Polarization as Policy
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this campaign is the sheer absence of political will to prevent such a crisis. Initiatives aimed at depolarization or electoral safeguards have been neglected. No party is actively seeking compromise. Dialogue has been replaced by escalation. Polarization has ceased to be a by-product of partisanship and has become the objective itself.
This nihilism is not limited to institutional politics. It is reflected in Poland’s broader political culture. The erosion of Polish-Ukrainian relations is not simply a diplomatic failure. It is a symptom of a society increasingly unwilling to sustain long-term commitments or pursue inclusive strategies. The shift from solidarity to suspicion has not only harmed refugees — it has weakened Poland’s international standing and soft power.
Much will depend on whether political narratives continue to focus narrowly on denying specific benefits — such as child support — to unemployed Ukrainians, or whether they evolve into broader attempts to restrict access to the welfare state altogether. Despite its limitations, the Polish welfare system still offers certain universal provisions, including access to public healthcare. In this context, Karol Nawrocki has already pledged to give Polish citizens priority in medical queues — a proposal that signals a more systemic exclusionary approach.
The current situation is already cause for concern. What happens if, following the end of the war in Ukraine, millions more people seek to relocate to Poland? A poll conducted by the Razumkov Centre and the Democratic Initiative Foundation in January this year shows that 21% of Ukrainians plan to leave after the war ends, while an increasing number of those already in the country express the desire to remain permanently. In 2022, every second Ukrainian wanted to return to their country, and in 2025, every sixth Ukrainian wanted to return. Given the likely postwar dynamics — including the risk of capital-driven “colonisation” of Ukraine and the persistence of a frozen conflict — it is reasonable to expect that far more Ukrainians will arrive than current estimates suggest.
In the end Poland was once viewed as a regional leader in humanitarian response. Today, it risks becoming a cautionary tale.
A Campaign Without a Center
The 2025 presidential election has revealed not just a crisis of governance, but a crisis of representation. This is the most ideologically extreme campaign since 1989. The far-right has shaped the discourse to such an extent that even moderate liberals now appear defensive, hesitant, or silent on basic questions of human rights and democratic norms.
As said our editorial colleague, Małgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat: Voters on the left — as well as centrist liberals who value open borders, civil liberties, and inclusive governance — are now effectively disenfranchised. Their preferences are not reflected in the public debate. Their candidates are marginalized. Their language — the language of rights, solidarity, and democracy — has become foreign to the mainstream.
A much-saying moment of the candidates’ debate: the Law and Justice-supported candidate Karol Nawrocki attacked Rafał Trzaskowski by claiming that he would tour Poland under rainbow LGBT+ flag instead of the Polish flag. Trzaskowski, who used to portray himself as a progressive liberal, took the LGBT+ flag from his opponent but hid it under his table. It was the social-democrats’ candidate Magdalena Biejat who offered to take the flag from him and suggested she would proudly refer to LGBT voters in her campaign. Photo source
The second round of the election will likely intensify this trend. As candidates vie for the most radical votes, moderation will be treated as weakness, not virtue. The electorate is being mobilized not toward deliberation or reform, but toward entrenchment and antagonism.
The costs of this approach will not be felt on election day. They will be felt long after — in the institutions that are further hollowed out, in the communities that grow more divided, and in the opportunities that are lost to fear, fatigue, and political short-sightedness.
What about the left?
The Polish left is struggling for political survival. Following its split at the end of last year, the coalition fractured into two separate entities: Together and the New Left. Only the latter remains part of the governing coalition. While the government has recently promoted measures such as subsidies for housing loans and supported a reduction in health insurance contributions — after previously introducing a range of tax breaks for entrepreneurs — there has been no movement on key progressive issues. Liberalisation of abortion laws or the legal recognition of same-sex unions remain absent from the legislative agenda. Broader social policy goals, such as strengthening the public healthcare system or expanding state-led housing initiatives, have seen only limited progress or have definitely been pushed aside.
Simultaneously, the New Left — composed largely of post-Socialist personnel and institutions — has allowed its long-time leader Włodzimierz Czarzasty, a figure whose political career dates back to the Socialist times, to appoint his proteges into senior positions within the government. The consequences have been politically damaging. The (now former) Minister of Science, drawn from Czarzasty’s camp, has been accused of using his office to promote allies and undermine public institutions — including IDEAS NCBiR, a research centre critical of the government’s approach to science and innovation policy. As the liberal outlet Oko.press reported, the minister came to symbolize the worst aspects of political life: nepotism, cronyism, and a disregard for ethical boundaries.
Another minister to be dismissed was Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Szejna, accused in the media of assaulting a woman, being drunk while on duty, harassing party staff and other pathological behaviour. The case has not yet been clarified, but it is telling that the accusations were led by his own party structures in the Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship.
Social democracy entering the game?
The Together party, by contrast, continues to fight for political relevance — seeking to establish its own electorate, identity, and voice within the Polish political system. Since its founding in 2015, when it secured 3% of the vote and thus qualified for public subsidies, the party has faced persistent difficulties gaining visibility in mainstream media. Liberal elites largely blamed the Together party for the electoral collapse of the post-communist left that year. Under the D’Hondt method used to allocate parliamentary seats, the fragmentation of the left contributed directly to Law and Justice securing a legislative majority.
In 2019, the young party aligned themselves with post-communist forces for the parliamentary elections, repeating this strategy again in 2023. Yet despite running on a joint ticket, the Together party was ultimately sidelined during coalition negotiations. None of the party’s demands were included in the coalition agenda, and their presence in the Sejm and Senate — a modest total of ten seats — proved irrelevant to the formation of the new government. The machinations of Tusk and Czarzasty led to the party splitting in two, and the ringleader of this split, Magdalena Biejat, ultimately became the presidential candidate for the New Left.
If the result of Together party candidate Adrian Zandberg is higher than Biejat’s, as polls suggest, it could mean a new beginning for the left in Poland. A formation free from cronyism and a history of corruption, which is synonymous with a lack of trust for most working-class voters, as shown by Maria Snegovaya. Any result above 5% will be the starting point for building a party that will be able to exceed this level in parliamentary elections, thereby gaining independent representation in the Sejm.
Major realignment ahead
The 2025 Polish presidential election is not merely a contest between candidates. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a reflection of a more profound structural realignment, one which involves a concurrent strain on political language, institutional integrity, and civic trust. The concept of nationalism, once considered marginal, has evolved into a language of consensus. Neoliberal dogma has re-emerged with renewed intensity, cloaked in populist rhetoric. The centre – both in its institutional and ideological sense – has effectively collapsed under the pressure of strategic short-termism and systemic neglect.
Rafał Trzaskowski (first to the right) as one of the speakers at a Solidarity with Ukraine event in 2022. In 2025, he says that the migrants must get the message that one comes to Poland to work and not to get social support, and that after years of generosity we need a ‘healthy and balanced’ migration policy. Photo source
The resultant landscape is one of fragmentation. The right commands the narrative, the liberals capitulate to its terms, and the left fights for its very survival. It is fractured, marginalised, yet not without potential. Should the Together party succeed in establishing itself as a credible force, independent of the legacy of cronyism and elite accommodation, it could present the beginnings of a new political alternative. However, the validity of this assertion is contingent upon the attainment of a definitive outcome in a single presidential contest, a scenario that is unlikely to materialise. The restoration of trust among those who have long since withdrawn from public life will be the most crucial element. In order to achieve this, there will need to be organisation and long-term strategy.
The most perilous outcome of this election may not be very figure of the president (even though many voters can sincerely feel unrepresented by any candidate), but the fate of Polish democracy in the period following the campaign. In a political climate where dialogue is replaces with political escalation and collective ambition with moral fatigue, the costs will be measured not in poll numbers, but in the hollowing out of democratic norms and the quiet withdrawal of citizens from a system they no longer believe in.
Whether the second round will serve to consolidate these trends or offer a respite from them remains to be answered. It is evident that the mainstreaming of the (far) right has already occurred. This shift has not manifested abruptly; rather, it is a gradual process of erosion that has gradually eroded the boundaries that once delineated the democratic consensus.
Subscribe to Cross-border Talks’ YouTube channel! Follow the project’s Facebook and Twitter page! And here are the podcast’s Telegram channel and its Substack newsletter!
Like our work? Donate to Cross-Border Talks or buy us a coffee!
About The Author
_-_Biejat_flaga_LGBT_01.jpg){kind=link}
