Netanyahu needs war to face political crisis
The way the renewal of full-scale genocide in Gaza is being presented is misleading. The problem is not that Netanyahu is applying pressure to secure the release of the Israeli captives—that’s just a pretext. What they’re really trying to do is avoid having to withdraw from Gaza, which is supposed to happen in phase two of the ceasefire framework.
The real issue is the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza—and beyond that, allowing for the reconstruction of Gaza, which Israel clearly doesn’t want to do — says Ofer Neiman, an Israeli left activist involved in the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement.
What stands behind the decision to bomb Gaza again, while at the same time Lebanon is attacked as well?
The renewed attack on Gaza is very much connected to Netanyahu’s huge problems in Israel – several crises at once that are wreaking havoc on the political sphere. First, the ruling coalition is unstable, he needs more war, more conflicts. Second, more and more people don’t want to “fight” in the genocide against Palestinians, lastly, the economic situation is heading south, and Israel is becoming more and more isolated.
He’s under a huge amount of pressure on multiple fronts. Right now, he’s trying to rebuild—or rather, to strengthen—his coalition by once again inviting the most extreme fascists to government and to pass the budget law, which was absolutely essential for the survival of his government.
And do you think he actually has the political and military support to go into Gaza, to occupy all of it?
Honestly, I don’t think he does. It seems like he lacks both the political support inside Israel and maybe even the military capacity to launch a full ground invasion and take over the entire Gaza Strip.
And what about the captives—those held in Gaza? In Polish media, and more broadly in European media, the focus is almost entirely on the Israeli captives.
Yeah, that’s true. But the way the renewal of full-scale genocide in Gaza is being presented is misleading. The problem is not that Netanyahu is applying pressure to secure the release of the Israeli captives—that’s just a pretext. What they’re really trying to do is avoid having to withdraw from Gaza, which is supposed to happen in phase two of the ceasefire framework. According to that plan, more captives are to be released, but that’s not the core issue here.
The real issue is the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza—and beyond that, allowing for the reconstruction of Gaza, which Israel clearly doesn’t want to do. They are also reluctant, though perhaps to a lesser extent, to release some so-called “heavy” Palestinian political prisoners. That part would still have to be negotiated.
And what about the families of the captives? Where do they stand on this?
In general, most of the captives come from parts of Israeli society that are now less supportive of the genocide in Gaza. I’m not saying they’re anti-war across the board, but they’re not 100% behind this idea of pushing Palestinians out of Gaza. Many of them come from the more centrist or liberal segments of society, and these people are increasingly willing to reach some kind of deal, to let Gaza rebuild and move on.
We’ve already seen protests by returning captives and their families. Some of them are demonstrating against the renewal of the war. Of course, they’re rarely explicit about opposing the genocide in Gaza, but their stance shows they are against the continuation of Israeli military action.
And there’s also growing frustration among people who keep being called up for military service, especially if it’s for a renewed ground invasion of Gaza. I think nowadays there are more and more Israelis who simply don’t want to be part of that invasion any more.
But is that really a majority position? Because at the same time, we see other families of captives—some of them aligned with far-right groups—pushing hard for continued war and even a full invasion.
That’s true, but they’re a small minority. Among the families of captives, the far-right voices calling for invasion are loud but not representative. And among the general Israeli public, polling suggests that by now there is actually a majority in favour of a deal and against the continuation of the war.
So in that sense, Netanyahu is acting against the will of the Israeli majority. But—and this is important to say—most Israelis still seem to be fine with Palestinians being killed. So even if they say they support a ceasefire or some kind of deal, you won’t see widespread opposition to the killing of Palestinians. Because at the end of the day, a large part of Israeli society is simply very racist.
But at the same time, Netanyahu still enjoys support from the U.S., right?
Yes. Apparently, Trump applied some pressure for a ceasefire back in January. I don’t really know what’s happening now—maybe he’s being blackmailed, or something else is going on. He’s unpredictable, honestly. He’s a madman.
We can only hope that in the next day or two, if there’s counterpressure from other Western governments—or maybe from people inside the Pentagon or the State Department—then perhaps he’ll call for a ceasefire.
But again, it’s impossible to say. He’s completely unpredictable.
And this is what the Israeli human rights group called B’Tselem, they’re also reporting on, especially regarding the West Bank.
Yes, exactly. You can read their most recent report—it’s very clear about the situation in the West Bank. What we’re seeing there is a process of forced evacuation, demolitions, and military operations. And it’s happening on a daily basis.
And what about Lebanon? Is the fighting going to escalate in any way?
Yes, it is serious. But let’s not forget: those rockets are being fired in response to Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza. That’s the proper context. And if the genocide continues, we can definitely expect more Israeli bombings in Lebanon.
Right now, Israel is already illegally occupying five points inside Lebanese territory. If this situation isn’t resolved through diplomacy, it’s likely to provoke more armed resistance from Lebanese forces sooner or later.
And what about Syria? Because I remember that during the most recent wave of the Arab revolutions, Israeli forces advanced further into the Golan Heights, getting closer to Damascus than before. They took some territory as a so-called security zone. Are they still there?
Yes, absolutely. Israel is still occupying parts of southern Syria, in addition to the long-standing occupation of the Golan Heights.
They’re also carrying out air raids, destroying property, and essentially trying to divide and dismantle Syria—using all sorts of false claims, like “we’re protecting the Druze,” which is nonsense. Druze communities there are not asking for Israeli protection. In fact, they still feel Syrian even in the Golan Heights.
What Israel is trying to do is carve Syria into two or three separate entities. A Kurdish-Druze-dominated zone in the east and south, an Alawite-dominated coastal region, and whatever remains—a Sunni-majority area, based on Israel’s own sectarian logic. That’s their strategy: divide and rule. Even though there are no official documents showing that, this is the narrative that is present in the media.
There’s also that odd theory going around that the new government of Ahmad al-Shara is somehow a proxy of Israel. Is there anything to prove that?
No, that’s not true. Israel does not see the new government as a proxy. Quite the opposite: they consider them a threat. That’s why they have bombed Syria more than 500 times since December, when Assad’s regime fell. Israel does not see any Islamist force in the region as an ally.
Is this plan to divide Syria official? Has the Israeli government made any formal statements?
No, there’s no formal policy document or official announcement. But there have been multiple statements from Israeli officials over the years implying that a fragmented Syria is preferable to a unified one.
For example, Israel issued a warning to the Syrian government regarding a town in southern Syria—called Jaramana, I think. They threatened that if government forces entered the town, Israel would intervene “to protect the Druze community,” even though the local Druze hadn’t asked for any intervention. You can Google this—Jaramana, Syria—and you’ll find Israeli statements clearly reflecting a divide-and-rule approach.
Jaramana? That’s part of the greater Damascus area, right? So pretty close…
Yes, it’s quite close to Damascus. And yes, the Israeli occupation zone in southern Syria is now not far from the capital.
And how is the Syrian government responding to all this? Are they doing anything about the Israeli presence? Or are they more focused on internal conflicts, like with the Alawite militias?
They’re definitely not interested in fighting Israel right now. For one, they simply don’t have the military capacity to do so. There was an internal conflict recently—a massacre carried out by forces affiliated with the government against Alawites, apparently in response to an uprising including civilian killings committed by Alawite supporters of Assad.
So yes, there’s internal violence, but the government doesn’t seem to want a direct confrontation with Israel. At the same time, they’re very quiet about the Israeli occupation, which is fuelling all sorts of conspiracy theories.
But the bottom line is: Al-Shara is not working with Israel, and Israel does not see him as an ally or puppet. And at some point, I think we’ll see renewed tensions around the Israeli occupation in southern Syria.
Do you think the situation will escalate soon—like in Gaza, Lebanon, or Syria?
If Israel doesn’t withdraw from Gaza, I think we’ll see further escalation in Lebanon. If the genocide, the bombings, and maybe even another ground invasion continue, we’re going to see more rocket fire from Lebanon. And that, in turn, will lead to more Israeli bombings there.
Could that even include a ground operation in Lebanon?
Hard to say. I think it depends on how many rockets are launched from Lebanon. A large-scale attack might provoke a ground operation, but so far that’s not certain.
And what about Gaza? Are Israeli forces advancing there?
Yes. They’ve recaptured most of Netzarim and opened a corridor that splits Gaza into northern and southern parts. But for another full-scale invasion like we saw a year ago, Israel would have to call up a massive number of reservists—and many of them are already very reluctant to return to service.
So I’m not sure. I hope we don’t see another ground invasion on that scale.
And how might Hamas respond?
So far, Hamas has launched some rockets—they even targeted Tel Aviv two days ago, which was a bit unexpected. I think their focus right now is on targeting Israeli forces already inside Gaza.
If even a single Israeli soldier gets killed soon, that could strengthen domestic opposition to the war and the idea of a broader invasion. I think that’s what Hamas is aiming for: to resist on the ground and turn Israeli public opinion further against the war.
I assume Hamas will try to protect the Israeli captives—after all, they’re bargaining chips.
Yes, of course. They will try to protect them. The captives are bargaining chips, and at this stage—that’s the card Hamas holds. By the way, according to Israeli intelligence, they still have around 25,000 trained combatants. So all these Israeli claims about having destroyed most of Hamas’s military capabilities are simply nonsense.
And what’s the current economic and social situation inside Israel? Is there any sign of recovery?
Not really. Prices are rising, and the state has to spend more and more to fund the war economy. The overall economy isn’t doing well. It hasn’t collapsed, no, but the cost of living is clearly going up. If you go to the grocery store, you’ll notice—you pay 30 to 40 percent more now compared to a year or a year and a half ago.
There won’t be any salary adjustments this year, at least according to the current agreement between the government and the unions. And for teachers, it’s actually worse—the government is planning to reduce their salaries.
This economic pressure is definitely a factor for the public, and perhaps even for some parts of the government. It could be one reason they’re hesitant to go too far with military escalation. But for Netanyahu himself, it’s not the main concern. If he believes that renewing the war and continuing the genocide in Gaza will help secure his political survival, then he will do it. He’s under a lot of pressure right now, and if war serves his interests, he won’t hesitate.
Cover photo: Gaza Strip destroyed after Israeli bombing. Source.
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