Bogdan Cozma: We observe a strengthening of the strategic partnership between Poland and Romania 

Bogdan Cozma is program coordinator at the German Marshall Fund, with expertise in the geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe and the role of civic engagement in strengthening democracy. His areas of expertise include the Three Seas Initiative, European Union institutions, foreign policy and the geopolitical dynamics of the Black Sea region.

He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and a Master’s degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) from the University of Bucharest. He is currently a PhD student at the Doctoral School in International Affairs of the Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies.

Bogdan Cozma explains the dynamics and contradictions of Romanian-Polish relations, warns that the dynamics of Romanian-Hungarian relations should not be exaggerated and notes an upward trend in Romanian-Ukrainian relations Cozma notes that the Euro-Atlantic partners want closer cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, but wants more cooperation initiatives to come directly from Bucharest or Sofia and not as a reaction to external pressure. As for Romania’s next president, the analyst concludes that whether he will be a sovereignist figure or a pro-European politician, his foreign policy will depend very much on which way the winds blow in the region. With Călin Georgescu’s nuclear option disarmed, Romania will still have good relations with Western Europe if a sovereignist president emerges. And if the president is pro-European, he is unlikely to be an active external actor and will most likely follow the European line without much initiative of his own.

Mr. Cozma, there is a Romanian fascination for Poland, for its economic success, for its influence at EU level, even for the verticality and dignity of its religious and God-loving people, who defend their interests in the EU. But we can also see through the last 10 or more years how when Romania elects a German-speaking president, Poland becomes sovereignist and vice versa – when Donald Tusk, accused in Poland of being pro-German, is prime minister in Warsaw, sovereignism increases in Romania. What is the true nature of the Polish-Romanian relationship? How much of it is competition and how much of it is based on common interests and cooperation?

Indeed, it has become easier and easier to see that both politicians in Bucharest and Romanian experts are closely watching Warsaw’s success. However, when we talk about Polish-Romanian relations, we cannot simply consider the dichotomy between cooperation and competition.

Poland is a model that both pro-Europeans and sovereignists want to replicate for diametrically opposed reasons. On the one hand, Poland attracts the interest of Romanian pro-Europeans, who see Donald Tusk as an example of a far-reaching leader, taken seriously by Western European partners in support of the European project. At the same time, sovereigntists appreciate the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) and, in a more radical form, the Konfederacja party, which promotes a nationalist and traditional values-oriented discourse and is rebellious towards Brussels. In other words, we can talk about a tacit respect of the Romanian political class towards Poland.

As for the election of leaders with pro-European or sovereignist views against the tide, this does not seem to have had a significant negative impact on bilateral relations. I draw your attention to the period 2012 – 2015, even when in Romania a politician was Prime Minister who today is a sovereignist candidate in the presidential elections in May 2025, while in Poland Donald Tusk was at the helm of government. This was not a barrier to the development of Romania’s relations with Poland.

Subsequently, as you mentioned, we saw a reversal of the situation: the election of a German-speaker in Romania, while in Poland a sovereignist coalition came to power. This did not lead to a deterioration in relations between the two countries either, as this was the period when joint strategic projects were being set up, such as the Three Seas Initiative, the Bucharest 9 format or cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

Following the loss of trust in Polish-Hungarian relations after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the then Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki visited Bucharest and a number of cultural and other cooperation initiatives between Romanians and Poles began to take place. What has happened in Romanian-Polish relations since Morawiecki’s visit from March 2023 to today?

The recent period has been a time of strengthening the strategic partnership between Poland and Romania, not only in the cultural, but also in the economic and defense fields.

From a cultural perspective, the two countries established March 3 as the day of Polish-Romanian solidarity, and this gesture was followed by the launch of the Romanian-Polish Cultural Season (2024-2025), which brought to the forefront exhibitions and events organized in museums and cultural institutions in both countries.

Perhaps an even more relevant development was the coordination in the field of defense. Romania decided to follow Poland’s example and purchase K9 self-propelled howitzers from South Korea, with plans to produce them locally. Given that Poland also uses the same system, the decision significantly helps to reduce maintenance costs.

From an economic point of view, trade between the two countries has exceeded €11 billion annually and we have seen decisions by large Polish companies, such as the Żabka group (behind the Froo brand) and PKO Bank Polski, to expand into the Romanian market.

However, it would be wrong to see these moves as the result of a deterioration in the relationship between Poland and Hungary. The Romanian-Polish partnership predates this rupture between Budapest and Warsaw and will continue to develop on the basis of common interests, regardless of developments in the relationship between Poland and Hungary.

Hungarian-Romanian relations have been at a high level for a long time. How does this rapprochement between Romanians and Hungarians – at the level of elites and people – influence Polish-Romanian and Ukrainian-Romanian relations? Is there not a certain reluctance to come closer to Poland and Ukraine among Romanian elites and especially among Romanian sovereignists?

Here you have raised several interconnected questions, let me address them in turn, starting with Romanian-Hungarian relations.

These relations manifest themselves more at a declarative level. Of course, Hungary’s support for Romania’s accession to the Schengen area was recognized and appreciated by the political class in Bucharest. But if we look beyond this episode, we can see that most of the concrete cooperation projects between the two countries are taking place in multilateral formats, such as the European Union, NATO or the Three Seas Initiative, which also involve other states.

At the bilateral level, we have seen declarations of the desire to intensify cooperation in various areas (energy, trade, transportation, etc.) during government meetings between Romania and Hungary. However, even in these contexts, the Romanian side publicly emphasized the security risks posed by the Russian Federation. Therefore, we cannot talk about significant progress. A recent example is the opposition expressed by the Romanian authorities to the Hungarian group MVM’s intention to acquire E.ON, which was motivated by security considerations.

Economic relations have not progressed significantly either. The share of Romania’s imports from Hungary fell from 8.4% in 2010 to 6.3% today. By contrast, imports from Poland have increased over the same period from 3.6% to 6.2%.

Hungary’s ability to influence Romania’s relations with Poland or Ukraine is insignificant. First, such influence would run counter to Romania’s security interests. Secondly, it would generate tensions not only in relations with these two countries, but also in relations with Brussels. And thirdly, from a realistic perspective of international relations, Hungary has nothing to offer Romania, neither economic benefits nor security guarantees, that could give Budapest such influence. The mere sympathy of a minority segment of the political class and the electorate is not enough to bring about drastic changes in foreign policy.

With regard to the position of the sovereignist political elites towards a possible rapprochement with Poland and Ukraine, I will first mention that the two countries should be treated separately. In the case of Poland, both segments of the political spectrum in Bucharest are following developments in Warsaw with interest; this does not necessarily mean a strong desire to strengthen cooperation. However, the current representatives of the sovereignist current in the presidential race have in the past shown openness towards Poland.

The situation in Ukraine is more complex. Here there is indeed a reluctance on the part of the sovereignists to move closer, but this position is not influenced by Hungary. Rather, the influence exerted by Washington, and in particular President Donald Trump’s stance towards Ukraine, will have a much more significant impact. It will amplify or, on the contrary, diminish this reluctance of the sovereigns.

Romania had some open issues with Ukraine after the break-up of the Soviet Union. But in October 2023 the two countries established a strategic partnership, and in the summer of 2024 they signed a security cooperation agreement. What is the current state of bilateral relations? How satisfied are Romanian political elites with some of the issues, which used to divide – for example, the state and the cultural rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine?

For those who look from the outside and try to understand the nature of Romanian-Ukrainian relations, it is important to first understand that until 2014 Ukraine did not exist in the collective mind of Romanians as a sovereign, independent state with its own foreign policy. Before Euro-Maidan and the outbreak of war in Donbas, Romanian society perceived Ukraine rather as an extension of Moscow. That is, a state aligned to the Kremlin’s agenda, in a way comparable to the current perception of Belarus.

The conflicts to which you referred, such as the dispute over the delimitation of the exclusive economic zones around the Snake Island or the Transnistrian conflict (in which Romania supported the Republic of Moldova while Ukraine supported Transnistrian separatist forces) did nothing to thaw bilateral relations.

The situation changed significantly after 2014. A first step was the intensification of trade relations with the reduction of customs duties following the signing of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. Subsequently, several important steps followed to strengthen cooperation in areas such as security, infrastructure and culture.

With the large-scale Russian invasion triggered on 24 February 2022, Romania provided Ukraine with significant military support. Although these transfers were carried out without transparent communication to Romanian citizens, it is known (from the Ukrainian press) that Romania provided equipment and ammunition compatible with the Soviet systems in the Ukrainian army, as well as modern military technology such as a Patriot battery.

However, Romania’s most important support was logistical. Our country has facilitated the transit of weapons delivered by other European countries, including Bulgaria, to Ukraine. Romania also allowed Ukrainian ships to use Romanian ports to export products to European and African markets. In the same vein, plans to build an airport between the cities of Braila and Galati have been accelerated in order to strengthen the logistics network on Ukraine’s southern border. Last but not least, Romania is playing a leading role in training Ukrainian pilots at the Fetești air base where a European training center for F-16 aircraft has been set up.

In turn, the Ukrainian side has responded to these efforts with several decisions that have strengthened the bilateral partnership. The most important was the recognition of Romanian, and not the so-called “Moldovan language”, as the official language of the Romanian minority in Ukraine.

There are, of course, other unresolved issues concerning the rights of the Romanian minority in Ukraine, but I am convinced that they will be resolved in the near future. Unfortunately, this issue has been seized almost exclusively by sovereignist politicians in the public arena. I consider this to be a major strategic error on the part of the pro-European camp, especially in view of the fact that respect for the rights of national minorities is one of the fundamental values of the European Union. Moreover, Ukraine is obliged to address them anyway as part of the EU accession process.

So, despite the sovereignist trend, the position we are in today in terms of Romanian-Ukrainian relations is much better than before 2014.

What changes do you expect in Romania’s regional relations – with Poland, Hungary and Ukraine, if the next president of Romania is a sovereignist and if he is a pro-Weimar Triangle figure? In fact, how would you define the foreign policy choice that Romanian voters have to make when opting for one candidate or another – is it between the Weimar triangle and countries dominated by sovereignists, or should it be defined differently?

Fortunately, we are no longer in the “code red” situation of December 2024, when a Călin Georgescu victory would have meant a major disruption of all Romania’s foreign commitments, not only in relation to Poland and Ukraine. Romania will continue to bear the consequences of the decision to invalidate the presidential elections, especially in relation to its strategic partner overseas, which has vehemently criticized this decision. However, in terms of cooperation with European countries, the situation is no longer as alarming.

So, if we look at the representatives of the sovereignist current, George Simion and Victor Ponta, we can see that they are not totally opposed to dialog with European partners. Whether we are talking about George Simion’s appearances alongside nationalist European leaders such as former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki or current Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, or about Victor Ponta’s term of office from 2012-2015, none of these leaders seems willing to make radical commitments that would break Romania’s ties with the European Union.

Nor do they have the capacity to do so. Although parallels are often drawn between them and Viktor Orban, one important detail is often overlooked: the consolidated control that Orban has built up over his own party over the years. By comparison, George Simion is in a fragile position. The sovereignists are divided into three parties, two of which (POT and SOS) were founded by people in open conflict with Simion and who can withdraw their support at any time. Even within the AUR party, which he leads, there are rumors of a possible rift between him and the other co-president, Claudiu Târziu.

If Romania’s future president is a sovereignist, he will most likely seek to benefit both from European partners and from other actors such as China, with whom he will try to interact without making major commitments that would attract repercussions from the European side. As regards relations with Ukraine and Russia, the positioning of the US and the possible response of the European Union will play a decisive role. A sovereignist president, whichever of the two, will not be a trailblazer, but will wait to see which way the geopolitical winds blow.

I do not know if the label ‘pro-Weimar triangle’ is the most appropriate one in this context, as the three countries, Poland, Germany and France, are also facing internal sovereignist waves and do not always act as a united bloc in all areas. For example, in the debate on nuclear energy, Romania sided with France and Poland against Germany and Austria. In addition, Romanian politicians in opposition to the sovereignist trend do not necessarily claim to be pro-German, pro-France or pro-Poland, but rather define themselves as pro-European or pro-Euro-Atlantic. In this sense, a more appropriate label would be pro-Europeans or supporters of the Snagov Pact.

If the next President of Romania will be pro-European, it is to be expected that foreign policy will not undergo major changes from the direction followed so far. However, it is worth noting that the foreign policy promoted by Romania’s traditional political class has generally been reactive rather than proactive. A pro-European president will follow the direction set by Brussels, but he is unlikely to be an active player, with initiative in promoting the interests of the European Union in the region, as Poland, Lithuania or even the Republic of Moldova do.

The war in Ukraine led to the signing of a strategic partnership between Bulgaria and Romania in March 2023. What next in Romanian-Bulgarian relations after the presidential elections? Who or what is the force for change in these relations? How great is the ambition of the two countries to take them forward and what are the obstacles to this?

It is paradoxical how two neighboring, allied countries with such a close culture and history, which have gone through the processes of joining NATO, the European Union and, more recently, the Schengen area together, only end up signing a strategic partnership in 2023, and this in the context of the war in Ukraine.

Although I am not familiar with Sofia’s foreign policy in detail, I believe that Bulgaria, like Romania, is adopting a reactive foreign policy, whereby both countries wait for opportunities for cooperation to present themselves, instead of initiating the dialog themselves. This lack of initiative seems to me to be the main obstacle to the development of Romanian-Bulgarian relations.

With the signing of this strategic partnership, I am confident that bilateral relations will continue to strengthen. It is a major step which can pave the way for new joint projects in the field of security, especially in the Black Sea region, energy and cross-border infrastructure.

As far as the ambition of the two countries to deepen this relationship is concerned, I believe that their strategic position as states on NATO’s eastern flank, with an outlet to the Black Sea and part of the Schengen area, is increasingly attracting the interest of the Euro-Atlantic partners, which want closer cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, as is also reflected in the US strategy for the Black Sea region. I believe that the political elites in both countries are driven by the geopolitical context to intensify the strategic partnership, something which will benefit both countries. Of course, I would like to see more and more cooperation initiatives coming directly from Bucharest or Sofia, and not just as a reaction to external pressure. However, for this to happen, there needs to be more dialog between Romanians and Bulgarians, and on this note, I would like to welcome the efforts you are making to stimulate as many conversations as possible between the two banks of the Danube.

Photo: Bogdan Cozma (source: Bogdan Cozma)

Subscribe to Cross-border Talks’ YouTube channel! Follow the project’s Facebook and Twitter page! And here are the podcast’s Telegram channel and its Substack newsletter!

Like our work? Donate to Cross-Border Talks or buy us a coffee!

About The Author