Is Trump Calling Nixon? An Unimaginable Reshuffle of the Global Order
In 1972, US president Richard Nixon decided to start the process of normalisation between Washington and Beijing. The manoeuvre was aimed to enhance America’s standing during the Vietnam War, a period which had elicited adverse reactions from global societies. President Nixon’s administration sought to mitigate the unfavourable sentiment towards the US by leveraging the political discord that had emerged between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. The competition for dominance in the communist sphere gave rise to escalating hostilities, which, over time, began to assume the potential for a perpetual threat. The culmination of the process was the 1979 full recognition of the People’s Republic of China, which paved the way to subsequent efforts to connect China to a globalised and US-hegemonized world of free trade, which ultimately led to China joining the WTO in 2001. Nixon’s manoeuvre created a tripolar world, the re-emergence of which was brought to our attention on Wednesday 12 February by the new US Secretary of Defence, Pete Hegseth.
Just a couple of days ago, newly appointed U.S. Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth arrived in Brussels for a meeting of NATO defence ministers. His address marked a radical departure from the security doctrine the United States had upheld in Europe since the end of World War II. Hegseth declared that “the harsh strategic realities prevent the United States from focusing primarily on Europe’s security.” He clarified it that Washington would shift its military priorities toward defending U.S. territory, safeguarding its global assets, and deterring China’s growing power.
Notably, a draft version of Hegseth’s speech, circulated to journalists before his remarks, contained an even more striking assertion: “The United States will no longer be the primary guarantor of security in Europe.” This statement raised profound doubts about the future of NATO itself, suggesting that the transatlantic alliance might no longer rely on the American defence umbrella as its cornerstone.
However, when it comes to Ukraine, he said that NATO membership for a country fighting Russia was ‘unrealistic’, as were ‘Ukrainian territorial claims’, i.e. the recovery of land illegally occupied by Russia. What’s more, Europe is expected to bear the brunt of the ‘vast majority’ of future material and economic aid to Ukraine. And that the United States will no longer take the lead in supporting Ukraine.
On the other hand, Hegseth declared that the US will not send its soldiers as a stabilisation force to Ukraine, if it were created it would be up to European allies, but they wouldn’t be able to count on the Article 5th of the North Atlantic Treaty in case of any violation of peace.
Trump-Putin Call
Then, Donald Trump revealed that he had engaged in what he described as a lengthy and remarkably productive discussion with Vladimir Putin. The former U.S. president emphasized that their exchange began with mutual acknowledgments of the “great and honourable history” shared by the American and Russian nations, before transitioning to forward-looking deliberations—centred primarily on securing an end to the war in Ukraine and outlining the future framework for cooperation between Washington and the Kremlin.
True to form, Trump could not resist highlighting a personal triumph: during their dialogue, Putin reportedly invoked the phrase “Common Sense,” one of the signature slogans of his presidential campaign. This rhetorical flourish was not merely incidental—both leaders, according to Trump, discovered a shared commitment to a recalibrated “realpolitik”.
More significantly, Trump disclosed that he and the Russian president had resolved to initiate immediate bilateral negotiations concerning Ukraine’s fate and its long-term geopolitical alignment. Beyond this, Trump announced his intention to hold a face-to-face summit with Putin, initially on neutral ground—Saudi Arabia being suggested as a likely venue. Simultaneously, both leaders have extended informal invitations to visit each other’s capitals, signalling what appears to be an ambition to inaugurate a new chapter in U.S.-Russian relations.
Decoding Trump
Shortly after his call with Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump briefed(!) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on what he described as the key outcomes of his discussion with the Russian leader. Their conversation reportedly lasted around an hour, though the substance of their exchange remains opaque. According to Trump’s account, however, Zelenskyy was urged to prepare for peace negotiations—an instruction that hinted at an impending diplomatic process largely driven by Washington and Moscow.
Nevertheless, Putin emerged from the 90-minute conversation with far more than just pleasantries. Trump had not only recognized the Russian president as a fully legitimate interlocutor but had elevated him to the status of an honoured statesman. Putin was granted de facto absolution for the war in Ukraine, welcomed back into the fold of high diplomacy, and extended the symbolic gesture of a potential invitation to Washington—an act steeped in the rituals of respect usually reserved for allies, not aggressors.
Conspicuously absent from Trump’s remarks was any reference to Russia’s culpability for the catastrophic human and material losses inflicted on Ukraine. No mention was made of the systemic war crimes committed by Russian forces, nor the blatant violations of international law stemming from both the 2022 full-scale invasion and the prolonged occupation of Ukrainian territory.
Signals from Trump’s wider circle—most notably U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s speech in Brussels—suggested that this overture to the Kremlin was part of a broader recalibration. The emerging contours of Trump’s approach indicated that the United States was prepared to pursue peace through substantial territorial and political concessions from Ukraine.
Equally, telling was Trump’s treatment of Ukraine and its European allies—not as central players, but as peripheral actors. His approach implied a preference for a return to the Cold War tradition of bilateral superpower diplomacy, with Washington and Moscow determining the fate of Eastern Europe over the heads of smaller states. In Trump’s vision, Kyiv appeared to be little more than a bystander, while European capitals were sidelined entirely.
MAGA Realism
American conservatives have engaged in protracted debates regarding the ramifications of a potential reduction in the US military presence in Europe and the purported economic drawbacks of globalisation. A salient concern is that the withdrawal of troops from Europe might engender a power vacuum, a scenario which could potentially invite adversaries such as Russia to augment their influence. This standpoint accentuates the notion that a diminished US presence could embolden rivals and thereby subvert national security. In parallel, however, the majority of these conservatives perceive China as the primary rival in the contemporary power struggle. The notion of a Sino-US struggle, initially propounded by Barack Obama, gained mainstream traction during Trump’s presidency.
By 2017’, China’s contribution to global GDP growth had surpassed that of the United States, the Eurozone, and Japan combined, amounting to more than one-third of the world’s economic expansion. The IMF and World Bank have repeatedly emphasised China’s pivotal role in propelling global economic expansion, particularly as advanced economies were still experiencing sluggish recovery from the 2008 financial crisis.
From an economic perspective, MAGA conservatives have argued that globalisation has resulted in significant losses for the US in terms of world trade. Trump’s circle claims that increased international trade has led to job losses in key industries and a decline in domestic manufacturing. For instance, a study by the Pew Research Center revealed that a mere 22% of white Republicans believe that the United States has gained more than it has lost from increased trade with other countries. These MAGA movement advocate for a reassessment of trade policy to prioritize American workers and industries, suggesting that current trade agreements often disadvantage the United States. They call for measures such as the imposition of reciprocal tariffs to level the playing field and protect domestic interests. The most radical factions even go so far as to openly denounce globalisation in its entirety, calling instead for a resurgence of American isolationism, reminiscent of the isolationist policies that characterised the United States in the nineteenth century.
If we consider that the Republicans are voted for largely by an economically excluded, agricultural, working-class electorate frustrated with the state of the US economy, while any indicators of the standard of living in the United States are wildly divergent from nominal GDP and the general indicators of this extremely stratified economy — we are dealing with a perpetual motion political machine combining conservatism and revisionism of the elites with social frustration directed, for better or worse, at the current globalised order.
Reversed Nixon
The 2017 China awakening led to the emergence of the concept of a ‘reverse Nixon gamble’ in 2017, which gained significant traction following the initial meeting between Trump and Putin on 7 July during the G20 summit. Many conservative pundits have argued that the strategic confrontation between Russia and China would create a geopolitical environment in which Moscow and Washington would be able to isolate Beijing.
What geopolitical advantages could Russia offer the USA? Conservative Republican geopoliticians, referring to McKinder and Spykman’s theories, believe that Moscow could surround China from the land side, while the US Navy would dominate the sea. This would allow the USA to focus on its own front and Russia would regain its empire and take over Central Asia, which is currently under Chinese control, including Kazakhstan, whose independence Xi Jinping wants to defend.
Of course, the revisionist arguments of Russian decision-makers do not need to be mentioned here. For Moscow’s imperialists, globalisation meant the end of their empire. The only question is: What a potential US turn towards Russia would look like? Presently, it is difficult to imagine such a thing, but it is easier to point out the people to whom such a manoeuvre would be ideologically close. Of course, Tucker Carlson, Tulsi Gabbard, but also JD Vance, Pete Hegseth, or maybe Elon Musk — they could all propose such a solution directly at some point. Weakening the Union, breaking it up, playing European countries off against each other one by one, isolating them, that is precisely their playbook.
What’s more, many American conservatives see in Russia a conservative catechon fighting the rotten liberalism that reigns in Europe, as outlined by JD Vance at a conference in Munich. At the same time, they do not see any problems with Russian interference in the electoral processes in Europe, but rather try to open as many doors as possible for them with their actions, seeing this as an opportunity for their own interference aimed at increasing the strength of the far right from Germany to Romania and France. Furthermore, a strong Russia is a potentially weak EU with its regulations, customs, wealth, and former imperial glory.
Unimaginable Reshuffle
Is this option currently on the table? It is rather difficult to imagine, but it is possible that some American elites will be interested in it if the European Union’s response to Trump’s completely non-allied, disrespectful or even hostile actions further inflames the turbo revisionist faction in Washington. What is more, they may start to propose such a solution openly.
According to many observers — assuming that Sino-Russian alliance is stable — Moscow may also be simulating interest in such a scenario, as it will be interested in short-term expansion of its influence and gaining as much as possible at the negotiating table with the US, while also trying to maximise the antagonisation of Atlantic relations, as strong EU-US relations ultimately mean weak Russia.
One thing is certain, the fact that such scenarios could be even seriously considered means one thing: unfortunately, we live in interesting times.
Cover photo: Donald Trump in 2024.
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