Konrad Poplawski: Regional cooperation in Central and South-Eastern Europe needs to be more institutionalised and project-based

Piotr Wójcik 

Konrad Poplawski works on international economic relations, supply chains and transport policy. He’s the author of numerous analyses and several longer studies on the development of the Central European and German economies and Eurasian transport corridors. In 2020-2022, he was head of the Central Europe team at OSW, and before that he was an analyst of the German economy for a decade. Coordinator and member of international research teams. Author of expert reports for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Development of the Republic of Poland. 

Konrad regularly gives guest lectures at Polish universities and conferences. He defended his PhD with distinction at the Warsaw School of Economics with a dissertation entitled Changes in Germany’s Foreign Trade after Joining the Eurozone. 

Piotr Wójcik  interviewed Konrad Poplawski on 7 November about economic and political relations between Germany and Central Europe, the impact of a new Trump administration in the White House on Central Europe’s relations with Ukraine, and regional cooperation in Central Europe. 

Hello everyone, good afternoon. My name is Piotr Wójcik and today I’m going to interview our next guest from the project entitled Perceptions of Changing Geography of Power in the European Union, Views from Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, which I’m conducting with the support of Vladimir Mitev, the Bulgarian expert on international relations and founder of the Bridge of Friendship and Cross-Border Talks at once websites. My current guest, whom I will be interviewing, is Dr Konrad Popławski – the project coordinator of the Connectivity and Regional Integration Programme at the Center of Eastern Studies (the Polish state think tank specialising in Eastern relations). Konrad’s research focuses on the economies of Central Europe and Germany. Hello Konrad.

Hello, good afternoon.

Let me ask the first question in this interview because, as I said at the beginning, this interview is dedicated to the power shift in Europe, to countries like Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. First of all, we have to focus on the western part of our continent, on Germany to be precise. Today we are seeing some visible problems in the German economy.

What are the reasons for this phenomenon and how is Germany responding?

We are at such a specific moment because the government in Germany probably just collapsed yesterday. So we’re probably going to have by-elections that show that something is not working in this whole German machine. One of the key determinants of this political crisis is economic problems, structural problems of a structural nature.

We see that Germany, after almost two decades of almost constant growth with some small pauses, is now facing some headwinds. The biggest problem at the moment is the automotive sector. For years it was the flagship sector of the German economy, a powerhouse of the whole European economy, generating a very large trade surplus and creating demand for services and products from other sectors.

It was also quite well integrated with central Europe and connected to German supply chains. And right now the car sector is having problems because of technological changes. We are experiencing a shift towards electromobility and Germany is not the best in this technology.

It hasn’t been a pioneer. It’s much better at combustion engines and this electromobility, which is based on battery skills to produce very high and competitive Lion batteries, is definitely not Germany’s advantage. That is the main reason why Germany has problems, and another problem is high energy prices because of a rather unsuccessful energy transition.

It was decided at the beginning of the second term of the Merkel government. She had three terms and it was the second term of the Merkel government. This programme was initially a symbol of pride.

It was supposed to make the German economy even more competitive in renewable technologies, but in fact it did not bear such fruits. When you have these two factors, high energy prices, also because Germany relied too much on Russia and gas supplies from Russia, this problem in the car industry because of technological change, high wages for German workers and lower efficiency because German workers are not as efficient as they used to be. We have this mixture that has led to this crisis.

And if we look at the reactions, the second part of your questions, we see that we have a very unstable government, which argues about everything in principle. Yesterday’s decision by Chancellor Scholz to sack the finance minister and at the same time the leader of the liberals, the FDP, the smallest party, was just a final countdown of these governments and actually shows that there is a lack of consensus, as there has been in the past among the German elites, on how to move forward with the economy, with the country, and especially with quite strong new opposition parties behind the scenes.

Let me ask you about something else. What is the general specificity of German investment in Central Europe, especially in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, or perhaps the general context in our region will be particularly valuable. Will these problems, the current problems in the German economy, affect the countries of Central Europe? If so, in what way?

So over the last three decades, Germany has integrated the Central European economies quite well into its industries. I would say that it is a very historical concept of Mitteleuropa, so the concept from the beginning of the 20th century describes quite well what the goal is. So, the goal was that Germany opposed other great powers, European powers in the past did not have colonies and they needed some countries to increase their power in terms of population, economic skills, and access to the EU enlargement was a perfect moment to do that, to expand, for German companies to expand in Central Europe, to build factories here, which helped to lower the costs of the German economy. It also provided a fairly highly skilled and motivated workforce, which was also fairly cheap.

And so it was initially a very great symbiosis, because it also helped Central Europe to improve its organisational skills and to learn how to run professional factories on a world scale. And that’s why Germany became the biggest trading and investment partner of almost all the countries in the region. To some extent it worked quite well, but at that stage, when we were much more developed, we were already mostly higher than middle-income countries, which is a problem because cooperation with Germany doesn’t offer too many opportunities for innovation.

They see us more as a region, as a low-cost production base that helps to drive down the price of final products, such as cars, machinery and other products. And that interest is a little bit dissipated here. Why is that?

Because most of the Central European countries that have reached a certain level also want to develop innovation, and Germany doesn’t want to and can’t offer that. On the one hand, they have their own problems, and on the other hand, I think they are somehow afraid of creating competition here. So it’s a big question mark as to how this cooperation will continue, whether we will find new areas of cooperation, or whether there will be some kind of competition because of the problems of the general European industries, or whether the Central European states would like to work together and cooperate more, to build some regional economic initiatives and maybe regional companies, because it’s a big problem for almost every Central European country that we don’t have domestic companies here.

You talked about the great economic dependence of the Central European countries on Germany. I and our viewers would like to know more about this, because you also mentioned Central Europe in this context. What is Germany’s attitude towards the rise of Poland and other countries in Central Europe, or this theory, these potential situations, and how does Germany perceive some regional cooperation within the Central European states, like the Precis Initiative format, or maybe other forms of our cooperation?

I would say that the question of whether the position of Central Europe has increased is still an open question, but certainly the potential for the region has increased in recent years. It’s up to us to decide whether we want to use this potential or not, because we might just miss this opportunity. In general, we know that the region is now much more important for geopolitical reasons, not only as the eastern flank of NATO, but it’s also stronger economically, but that doesn’t easily translate into influence on institutions, on global European institutions.

We are the most under-represented region in the EU. We are very poorly represented in high positions in the EU in terms of numbers. We are still struggling to become more innovative.

We are still good beneficiaries of the cohesion policy of the structural funds, but the problem is how to take the economy further, and we need technologies to do that, not just to become low-cost locations. I would say that the potential is there, but without good, efficient regional platforms, we cannot turn that potential into real influence, impact and political power, because the EU is also a very competitive environment, apart from cooperation. So when countries get influence, they don’t give it away for free.

So if all of us in Central Europe are somehow challengers, we could try to add up these potentials, for example, to create at least some platforms to apply together for some candidates for some top jobs, if we see that our region is very underrepresented. I think we have some common sensitivities when it comes to certain issues. I would say that after the invasion of Ukraine these sensitivities are even closer than before, because this threat from Russia is quite well perceived by most of the Central European countries, with some exceptions.

In my opinion, especially the Three Seas Initiative, this regional economic format, it’s a very wise idea and concept of how to make Central Europe more integrated, more cooperative. Maybe in the future, an optimistic scenario, even to create some good Central European companies that might even have the potential to become world players, because right now it’s very difficult to do it alone.

Yes, you explain the general attitude towards cooperation within Central Europe. And there is also the question of some regional or world powers, global powers, and also, according to this question, powers around the world, and one case, one thing that you said was more visible, that the collapse of the German government was more visible in recent days, perhaps yesterday, and also at this moment in German politics, was the elections in the United States, where Donald Trump won with a landslide, with a huge landslide, far more votes than Kamala Harris, were the elections in the United States, where Donald Trump won them with a landslide, with a big landslide, much more votes and electoral votes than Kamala Harris, and also in general, and some analysts, foreign policy experts, and not only, are wondering how Central European politics, international politics will develop in the next months and years, and do you think that the next Trump presidency will influence Central Europe, also our cooperation, how do you see that, and also the issue of Ukraine?

I think Central Europe would be a typical actor trying to somehow reconcile these transatlantic relations. We know it won’t be easy, because Trump probably won’t have good relations with Germany, and we will expect some European states to do their homework when it comes to military spending, when it comes to trade, but I think we will be a factor mitigating these problems, as it was during Trump’s first term. In general, I think maybe some of the Central European states could be one of the first places he visits.

I couldn’t exclude that he would like to visit the Three Seas Initiative Summit, which will probably take place in March or April next year in Warsaw, so yeah, there’s a huge potential and it’s very interesting if the US will also have some ideas to reform this format, because this format is already 10 years old and maybe some new impulses are needed. So yeah, when it comes to Ukraine, I think we’ll see what Trump has to do, what recipes Trump has, how to solve this war problem, and I think it’s also a potential for cooperation with Central Europe, which should be a decisive player in deciding these issues right now, because we are the closest, many of our countries here are the closest neighbours of Ukraine. So another factor is, of course, the integration of Ukraine.

We should also shape it according to our interests, because there are some opportunities in this process, but also some threats, so we should make it as conducive as possible.

I’m just thinking about all these questions, and I think, and perhaps also our listeners, people who are listening to us and watching us, are thinking about the great importance of the events, of the processes that have taken place, especially in the last few months and days, and you know that I asked you a lot of questions about Germany, because that is the next regional power on our continent, and perhaps the next question might also be interesting for other people, that in the last few weeks we have been observing the willingness, the readiness, the readiness to take action, the readiness to make decisions, In recent weeks we have seen the willingness and actions of some European governments to tighten migration policies, and an example of this phenomenon is Germany, which has regained control of all its borders, and there are also other countries in Europe that have promised or even introduced some restrictions on their borders, such as Norway, but let’s continue with our Central European issues, and my question is: how does migration affect relations between Poland and Germany and Polish foreign policy in Central Europe?

I would say that my question about migration is an issue that Central Europe has somehow pushed out of its interests, and the region has turned out to be right, so it’s scepticism about Europe’s ability to open its borders to mass migration was actually very accurate, and even Germany, which was initially a very big promoter of these movements and traffic, is now closing its gates and borders in a rather irregular way, is now closing its gates and borders in a very irregular way, so I wouldn’t say that it was very important, it was a kind of important issue for Central Europe at some point, especially for these four countries, these four countries, so Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, but I don’t think that this issue still has the potential to somehow connect the countries, it was important, It was important, it was a vital interest to oppose this somewhat naive and very short-sighted policy, but we also need a positive agenda, so it’s not the image of Central Europe, it shouldn’t be that it’s just a region that is against migration, I think we have much more to offer, so of course we should point out the points where countries are not fulfilling their obligations, Of course we should point out the points where countries are not fulfilling their obligations, either they are breaking the Schengen rules or they are trying to impose some rules that were not planned and agreed in the past, but I think there are many more important, many other important issues that we should solve together and this issue of migration should be just one example of how effective we could be if we join forces together.

And it’s good that you mentioned this perception and developed this issue further, and as you said, migration policy shouldn’t be the only one that could bring our countries in Central Europe closer together, also today there are, regarding your observations that you shared with us, that the international specificity is now different in Central Europe, but also regarding migration, there have been more situations, there was the process when Poland was against the EU and Germany, and now it’s hard to imagine the cooperation of some of these countries in different configurations, there was the process when Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary were definitely against the EU and German migration policy, and now it’s the cooperation of some of these countries, There was the process when Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary were definitely against the EU and German migration policy, and now it’s hard to imagine, for example, the cooperation of some of these states in different configurations, and also, as you said, we have to look at the reality and not be naive, I think these are very good conclusions of your speech, and let’s conclude, to come to the end of our interview, first of all, you said more about some specific issues of the German economy, you also explained the specificity of investments, of German investments in Eastern Europe, you also moved smoothly and very strongly to the larger background of international efforts in Central Europe, the region between Germany and Russia, and I think that I am convinced that these issues that you have touched upon are very important, and I assume that our listeners and viewers will think more and more about these issues and also about the name of our project and the channels of Cross-border talks and the Bridge of Friendship of Vladimir Mitev, I would like to thank you for this interview, it was a pleasure for me to talk with you on air and also to ask you these questions, and maybe you would like to add something at the end of our interview?

It was a pleasure on my part, so thank you very much, I think that just to sum up, we need to be much more specific and much more institutionalised in the region, I mean we need to work on some issues on a project basis and in a steady, regular way, because just such ad hoc meetings between political leaders it’s too few to make it happen, so I appreciate such grassroots concepts and initiatives to make Central Europe a viable and very vivid concept. Thank you very much.

Thank you very much.

I interviewed Dr Konrad Popławski, Project Coordinator for the Connectivity and Regional Integration Programme at the Centre for Eastern Studies in Poland. 

I encourage you to read more about his analysis and other activities. So Konrad, thank you very much for this interview. Thank you very much, good afternoon.

Foto:‌‌ Konrad Poplawski (sursă: Konrad Poplawski)

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