Why did Bulgarians’ and Gagauzes’ regions vote against Maia Sandu and the constitutional changes in Moldova, which are to allow EU membership?

Vladimir Mitev, The Bridge of Friendship,

Vladimir Mitev talks to Alexander Lambov, a PhD candidate in political science at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia and a programmer based in Chisinau.

On October 20, 2024, Moldovan citizens voted in a referendum to allow constitutional changes to enable and facilitate EU membership. Nationwide and after voting abroad, the referendum passed by a 1% margin (about 14,000 votes) in favor of a favorable response to these constitutional changes. But in the Bulgarian-populated region of Taraclia in southern Moldova, 92% of respondents voted against them.

In the second round of Moldova’s presidential election on November 3, 2024, 94% voted for the losing candidate, Alexandr Stoianoglo, while nationwide, including diaspora votes, Maia Sandu won the elections by a margin of 11%. The Gagauz Autonomous Region voted similarly in the referendum and presidential elections.

Alexandr Lambov explains why Bulgarians and Gagauz communities in the Republic of Moldova distrust President Maia Sandu and her party PAS, which is not unionist but which he believes is nonetheless a pro-Romanian party. He also explains why politicians such as Igor Dodon and Alexandr Stoianoglo are gaining the trust of Bulgarians and Gagauz in Moldova.

The conversation also tackles issues related to the attitude of Bulgarians and Gagauzes towards the EU, the deoligarchization that the government of Maia Sandu claims to be carrying out and the actions of the Bulgarian state in the Republic of Moldova. According to Aleksandr Lambov, it is a good thing that political contradictions in the strongly divided Moldovan society are being resolved at the institutional level and in accordance with the procedures in force, instead of resorting to violence and anarchy. However, he is not optimistic that during her second term in office, Maia Sandu will seek some kind of dialogue and intersection with the Bulgarian and Gagauz communities in Moldova. Lambov shares some ideas about what a concrete rapprochement between Maia Sandu’s people and the minorities in the south of Moldova might entail, but also states a well-known fact – that the two sides do not know each other and have a tradition of ignoring each other.

Mr. Lambov, Maia Sandu defeated Alexandr Stoianolgo in the presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova. The Bulgarian region of Taraclia and the Gagauz autonomy voted with results over 90% for Alexander Stoiaonglo, who lost the elections, and also voted with similar results against constitutional changes to allow the country to join the European Union.

What are the reasons for these Bulgarian and Gagauz preferences?

A very interesting question. Just to make a few clarifications on the referendum.

The changes to the Constitution have not so much made accession possible in principle as lowered the threshold for a vote in parliament on a possible accession treaty. The fact that Bulgarians and Gagauz Moldovans do not support Sandu and PAS is common knowledge to those who live here. And there are several reasons for this.

For me, the most important reason is that Maia Sandu personally and the PAS party are perceived as nationalist parties, as Romanophile parties. And this is a big taboo for Bulgarians and Gagauz in Moldova. I mean, it is a big taboo to vote for any Romanophile force. Because one of the most important issues, as I feel for Bulgarians and Gagauz, is the status of the Russian language in the state.

Sandu’s policy has acted inspiringly on the Romanian-speaking majority and is absolutely diametrically opposed to the Russian-speaking part of society. I think this is the biggest problem. In addition, there are economic difficulties, rising fuel prices, and natural gas being imported. More important, however, is this feeling that Sandu’s policies are against the interests of the Bulgarians and Gagauz in Bugiac (southern Bessarabia), as they understand them.

You say that Maia Sandu and her party are seen as Romanophile, but they are not actually unionists. Because, for example, the unionist leader in Romania, George Simion, is banned from entering the Republic of Moldova and is in bad relations with Maia Sandu herself. Why, in this situation, are there no links between Maia Sandu and the Bulgarians and Gagauz in the Republic of Moldova, if she is not a unionist?

Because there is a strong ethnic and linguistic polarization in the Republic of Moldova between the so-called Russian-speaking part, which includes Bulgarians and Gagauz, and the Romanian-speaking part. For both the Bulgarians and the Gagauz, the fact that Sandu is a Romanophile, though not a unionist, is enough for them to perceive her as a bad choice. This is enough for them to prefer Aleksandr Stoianoglo. Let’s not forget that Aleksandr Stoianoglo was born in Gagauzia and is perceived as closer socially to Bulgarians and Gagauz than Maia Sandu.

You mentioned that Romanian-speaking politicians are not to be liked, but which politician from the Romanian-speaking majority would be acceptable to Bulgarians and Gagauz? What qualities or positions would such a politician have to have in order for them to open up to him and have cooperation with him?

Politicians of the so-called left, in the Moldovan sense of the word, i.e. with the profile of Igor Dodon, perhaps Ion Ceban or Irina Vlah, are very well accepted. That is acceptable. But back to the previous question.

This lack of contact and good interaction is still two-sided. In a situation where this region gives only a few percent of the votes, right-wing politicians have no interest in interacting with the forces inside Gagauzia, in the Taraclia region, considering it useless.

Right-wing politicians say to themselves: “Whatever we do, they (Bulgarians and Gagauz – editor’s note) will not vote for us, so we don’t have to do anything and it is better to save resources”.

Otherwise, opinion in the country is very divided. If you ask a man from the Romanian-speaking part, he will tell you a story. For the same things, if you ask a person from the Russian-speaking side, he will tell you a completely different story. What is good for the Romanian-speaking person is perceived bad by the Russian-speaking person and vice versa.

This is the polarizing situation we saw in the elections. Interestingly, the Russian-speaking part is not as numerous as the Romanian-speaking part. These results, almost 50/50, show that there is a certain division even in the Romanian-speaking part of society. That is to say, support for Sandu is decreasing even among Romanian-speaking Moldovans. That is why the results are like this.

What are the arguments of Moldovans of all ethnicities, Bulgarians, Gagauz, but also, as you mentioned, Romanian-speaking Moldovans, that some of them voted no in the referendum and some of them refused to vote for him. That is, assuming that Russia, which is often accused of wanting to prevent Moldova’s integration into the EU, actually wanted to prevent this referendum from succeeding, why are some pro-Russian politicians in the Republic of Moldova calling for a no vote in the referendum and others calling for no vote at all?

That is a good question. Perhaps the explanation is that the no vote was demanded by political forces linked to Ilan Shor, who is closer to Russia than Alexandr Stoianoglo. Stoianoglo was demanding a no vote in the referendum… Perhaps Alexandr Stoianoglo and the Socialist Party had in mind that in any possible continuation it would be good to have some bridges with Europe and not to act in a way that would be absolutely unacceptable to European powers outside the country. That is, they adopted an intermediate position. They did not support a ‘yes’ vote, but they did not say a firm ‘no’ either. This is the explanation for me – they are not as close to Russia as the forces associated with Ilan Shor.

It is interesting that Bulgarians and Gagauz from the Republic of Moldova voted exclusively for Stoianoglo, both in the first and in the second round. How true is the idea that he is a pro-Russian candidate, given that it has been written that he is a Romanian citizen, like Maia Sandu, his daughter works at the European Central Bank and he himself helped the Republic of Moldova sign the association and free trade agreement with the EU 10 years ago. What exactly is his geopolitical position in the Bulgarian view?

According to Bulgarians, it is not that close to Russia. I mean the way it is perceived. Whether he really has links with Russia is something that is a secret relationship and cannot be established at the moment. In the case of Ilan Shor, it is obvious that he has secret ties and it is obvious that Russia wants to influence the elections in Moldova through him. There is no doubt about that. But there is also no doubt that, even without Russia’s influence, there are many protest votes in Moldova, and Russia is exploiting these objectively existing attitudes in society.

Stoianoglo seems to be further from Russia on this spectrum of discontent and closer to Europe than Ilan Shor. Stoianoglo is somewhat closer to Europe, more acceptable – at least that is how he tries to present himself. He tried to debate in Romanian and to speak Romanian, that is to say, he wanted to move away somewhat from being associated only with Russia. He is not as staunchly pro-European as Maia Sandu is, but he is not as pro-Russian as Ilan Shor either.

For the Romanian-speaking part of the population there is not much difference between Ilan Shor and Stoianoglo. But Stoianoglo wants to be more neutral. He is a new man in politics. He was not so well known before these elections. He did not apply for any political position that was notable before.

In my opinion, his result is not so much about his personality because he failed to show himself as a politician. Rather, his results are related to his position and his attitude towards Maia Sandu. The vote for him was probably more a protest vote than a vote for Alexandr Stoianoglo’s personality. In my opinion, it was rather a vote against Maia Sandu than for the politician Alexander Stoianoglo.

You mentioned Ilan Shor, one of Moldova’s famous oligarchs, who also has influence in the country, especially in the south. In recent years, especially with the coming to power of Maia Sandu, there has been talk about the need for deoligarchization, that is, to weaken the power of people who are considered oligarchs from the times of transition, such as Plahotniuc, Ilan Shor and others. How do Bulgarians and Gagauz see this process of deoligarchization, given that there is often an overlap between oligarchs and the so-called Russophile tendencies in Moldova from the point of view of anti-corruption lawyers?

To be honest, I do not think that Bulgarian voters think too much about this issue. The issue of deoligarchization is more important for voters in the capital. And rural voters are far away from these processes and I don’t think they think too much about it and I don’t think it is a factor in their decisions.

The result of the referendum and the result of the presidential elections show that there is support among Moldovan citizens for the course that has been followed so far, which is pro-European. That is to say, if they continue on this path, the reforms that are probably necessary for accession to the European Union will continue. How do Bulgarians and Gagauz view the possible future moment when Moldova will be part of the European Union? To what extent do they see their interest in this, even now, but also in the future, given that, as far as I know, the countries of the European Union, incl. Romania and Bulgaria, provide some financial assistance to the country and finance projects there?

Interesting question. I think there is a feeling among people who are thinking about these issues that accession to the European Union will help Moldova’s economic development. The programs that the European Union finances are well received.

The point is that not everything is solved with economic incentives and funding. The perception of the European Union is not so much an economic issue, but much more a political and social one. In other words, voters who vote against the European Union do not vote against it because they think they will lose economically. At least, many of them do not vote for that reason.

Among the inhabitants of Taraclia and Gagauzia, there are people who are working in Russia at the moment, but there are also many people who are working in the European Union. People vote against the European Union for social reasons. The European Union must give a social response and a political response to their concerns. I do not believe that economic incentives alone can counter this trend.

I am talking now only about the region of Bulgarians and Gagauz, not about the whole of Moldova, because this does not apply to the whole country. There is a feeling in this region that the Bulgarians and Gagauz living in the Republic of Moldova will lose out socially from accession to the European Union, not because of accession to the European Union itself, but because this accession will strengthen the power of the Romanophile and nationalist forces, which are perceived very negatively in the southern region. In my opinion, this is the mechanism responsible for a large part of the vote against the move towards the EU in the referendum.

If I understand correctly, Maia Sandu has put an equal sign between herself and the European Union. She said “Europe is me”.

Yes.

Could it be said then that Bulgarians and Gagauz don’t have such a big problem with joining the European Union, they just want to have their own direct channel to either European funds, European administration, European know-how, etc.?

I’ll give my opinion on that. I think the answer is simpler. If Maia Sandu says: “The European Union, that’s me”, and the European Union does not contradict this, then Bulgarians and Gagauz believe that if it is the European Union, we do not want the European Union with Maia Sandu at the head. That is my feeling.

So the issue of European funds becomes secondary. This is my opinion about things.

I have the impression that Stoianoglo’s supporters are not protesting against the results of the vote. Sometimes when there is polarization, there are protests. And in this case, they can say that they inside the Republic of Moldova, on its territory, won, and the diaspora changed the result. Can you comment on how you explain the calm of Stoianoglo’s supporters. Is there a division in the Republic of Moldova between the diaspora and the country or is it an exaggeration?

There are several questions here. First of all, let me say that I was reading the news a short while ago. The Socialist Party, which nominated Stoianoglo as its candidate, does not recognize the results of the presidential election precisely for this reason. It is not impossible that we will see protests. It is not known how strong they will be, but protests are not out of the question. After all, Moldova is a parliamentary republic and all political forces are preparing for next year’s parliamentary elections. Maybe that is why we do not see any sudden movements or actions at the moment.

Last but not least, Stoianoglo and the Socialist Party want to be accepted by Europe. And for that they are not acting very directly. But let’s see their actions, which could change.

The results of the referendum itself were validated by the Constitutional Court, but two judges dissented. In their opinion, the requirements were not met so that the decision to change the constitution could be accepted. This is very interesting. It has to do with a legal interpretation of some articles of the Moldovan electoral code. But it is interesting that there is this point.

Could you explain a little bit more what is their legal argument for this?

Yes. It is the fact that, when voting in this referendum, the difference between ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is, let’s say, 10 000 votes for the whole country. In addition, 40 000 ballot papers turned out to be invalid. The Electoral Code stipulates that for the decision to be adopted, a majority of those participating in the election must vote. If we consider that all those who voted are participants in the election, the majority has not been reached. The Constitutional Court stated in this decision, on which two judges disagreed, that only valid votes should be counted. But there are arguments against this.

In the same electoral code for local elections it is directly written that only valid votes are counted. And in the referendum articles it says that the quantity of voters is taken into account. And a legal case arises as to what is an election participant – a person who voted or a person who cast a valid vote.

This depends on the interpretation, depends on the decision. The Constitutional Court has taken the position that only valid votes should count. But some legal specialists, as I understand from personal conversations, have doubts about this interpretation. Nevertheless, the decision was accepted.

What do you think the future of the Republic of Moldova will be politically and socially in the coming years, when we will have a second mandate of Maia Sandu?

It depends on many things. There is a lot of uncertainty in the future. In my view, the best prospect for Moldova is for the pro-European forces and the European Union itself to pay attention to this protest vote, to address the problems that led to this kind of vote and to somehow show their opponents that the European vector is not some kind of risk, but a good thing.

That is what I would wish for as a citizen of this country. But I am not entirely sure that PAS and Maia Sandu have the political flexibility to do that. And if, in the worst-case scenario, it is not done, we are in for a period of intense political turmoil, which personally does not make me happy.

Bulgaria is an EU country. How do you assess its actions, its policy, its attitude towards Bulgarians and Gagauz and on the issue of Moldova’s accession to the EU?

From what I understand, Bulgaria has expressed its position that it supports Moldova’s future accession to the EU. Bulgaria has a very active policy towards Moldova. At present, it has good relations with the central government. It has good relations with the forces in Bugiac too. 

An agreement has been reached to open a branch of the University of Ruse in the city of Taraclia, which is a good thing, but it needs to happen in practice. This will be the first branch or subsidiary of a Bulgarian university in another country. For me, this is a major achievement, but we will see. There is an agreement to this effect. As far as I know, it has been ratified by the Bulgarian side. We are waiting for Moldova to make the appropriate changes to the legislation.

Personally, I see Bulgaria’s role in Moldova and in the Taraclia and Gagauzia region as positive.

Do you believe that Bulgaria or organizations in Bulgaria can do what you want – that Bulgarians and Gagauz have their own path to the European Union? Or is this not realistic, as the power in the Republic of Moldova will remain alien to them?

I believe that Bulgaria can take certain actions that would aim to change the situation. But the problem of the European path is not in Bulgaria, at least as I see it. The obstacle in this region is the lack of contact with Chisinau. Bulgaria cannot solve this problem without Chisinau’s cooperation.

We need some changes in Chisinau’s policy towards the Bulgarian and Gagauz region. This is what is important. Otherwise Bulgaria can play a positive role in this process.

And do you have any idea how these changes could take place?

Let’s imagine a world with unlimited political possibilities, where everything is possible. I sometimes think about what could change the attitude of Bulgarians and Gagauz towards these processes. First of all, in this situation, some formal guarantees for the status of the Russian language in the eventual accession to the EU would be welcome.

I mean the Russian language, which is important for Bulgarians and Gagauz, because the majority of Bulgarians and Gagauz in Bugiac graduated from Soviet and Russian schools. They know literary Russian, and Bulgarians and Gagauz use Russian in their work. This is very important.

The right-wing forces are doing exactly the opposite. They want to minimize the influence of the Russian language and the scope of the Russian language in the country, because they see it as a risk of Russian interference. This may be true to some extent, but it is not well perceived in the south.

Compromises on this issue would be welcome and would resolve many controversies that exist in the region. To say that Russian is acceptable would have a limited status, but there would be some guarantees for this as long as there is no interaction with Russia and Putin. That kind of position would help in this matter.

And is it realistic for this to happen during President Maia Sandu’s second term?

I am not sure that Sandu has the political flexibility and political savvy to do so. In addition, Sandu’s hardcore electorate will be against it.

The problem with Sandu is that she is not in the middle. Within a pole, she is too close to the right end. So it will be very hard for her to show the competence, flexibility and wisdom to do so.

Are there cases where Bulgarians and Gagauz are making efforts to learn the Romanian language and to establish a trusting relationship with the majority in Moldova? Perhaps they have organizations or initiatives in this respect?

There are cases. But I think they happen on an individual level, when Bulgarians migrate to Chisinau and go to live there. At some mass level, unfortunately, this is not happening. For this process to be effective, it takes years and a large amount of financial resources. All local and state officials in the region of Bulgarians and Gagauz practically all speak little Romanian and cannot be replaced by one or another.

The problem is complex. The problem is not yesterday’s problem. And because it is complex, it has not yet been solved.

At the end of our conversation, could you comment on what you see as positive in the events taking place in the country for Bulgarians and Gagauz and indeed for all the inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova?

Yes. The positive thing in all of this is that the contradictions are resolved in an institutional and political way and do not lead to extremism and extremes. Things move in the political order, through elections, through votes and so on.

The second positive thing, however, which is more a wish or a feeling of mine, is that this protest vote is more linked to certain individuals and not to the whole European idea. The future will show whether I was right.

The third positive thing is that there is the possibility and the potential to correct the course of the authorities in Chisinau so that they better reflect the wishes of the other part of society – the part that has doubts about what is being done. It remains to be seen whether this potential will be realized.

Photo: The Bulgarian-majority Taraclia region voted 92% against the constitutional referendum, which was to allow the EU accession (source: cec.md)

Subscribe to Cross-border Talks’ YouTube channel! Follow the project’s Facebook and Twitter page! And here are the podcast’s Telegram channel and its Substack newsletter!

Like our work? Donate to Cross-Border Talks or buy us a coffee!

About The Author