A Prime Minister out of a Hat

The former head of French diplomacy and EU Commissioner Michel Barnier has been appointed prime minister by President Emmanuel Macron. After weeks of consultations with political parties, Macron announced his decision after almost two months since the conclusion of the parliamentary elections on 7 July. France experienced a period of governmental uncertainty for 51 days – and the final outcome is hardly a triumph of democracy.

According to Agence France Presse’s sources in the executive, Barnier would be a Prime Minister ‘compatible with Macron’. Moreover, appears that there has been no explicit declaration of opposition to Barnier from the far-right National Rally led by Marine Le Pen.

However, the political magic from which the new government has emerged provokes, in the end, more questions than answers.

A veteran politician, Barnier first assumed a ministerial post in 1993, when he was entrusted with the environment ministry. During the presidencies of Jacques Chirac and later Nicolas Sarkozy, he served as a minister on three occasions in various ministries, including an episode as head of France’s Foreign Ministry from 2004 to 2005. He was entrusted with the portfolio of EU Commissioner on two occasions. From 2016 to 2021, he had the privilege of serving as a Brexit negotiator. He made a brief return to French political life in 2021, participating in the Republican primaries ahead of the presidential election. His programme included the suggestion of a ‘moratorium’ on immigration, which gained support from a small percentage of voters only at the time. Today, similar proposals circulate well in the mainstream.

In Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal offered an interpretation that a national constitution should have primacy over EU law, which was received with interest in France. Barnier, who has been involved in the EU for many years, was one of the presidential candidates who suggested that the constitution might be considered above EU law. During the primaries, Barnier put forth a proposal that included a moratorium on immigration (both legal and illegal) in France, a cap on welfare and free health care for immigrants, more efficient deportation procedures, and a ‘constitutional shield’ through a referendum to protect sovereign migration policy.

At the time, one could say he was singing the song of the current Le Pen party and the nationalists, who have since done a huge amount of work to de-diabolise the public perception of their views. Today, one could say, it is the French political mainstream – especially if we look at the immigration law established back in the previous parliament under the aegis of President Macron.

Why Barnier?

It is worth noting that, from the perspective of the Élysée Palace, Barnier may not be the ideal candidate to replace Macron in the future. Given his extensive experience as a minister, commissioner, MP, senator, MEP and councillor, he may not possess the same level of dynamism and fresh ideas that Macron had brought to French politics. Barnier looks like yet another bureaucratic droid, an active member of the post-Gaullist centre-right for almost 60 years. But Macron’s choice is not about new energy, but about eating a cake and keeping the biscuit. He is turning right without losing steerage by selecting someone who could pose a political threat. The future dolphin is yet to appear.

Nevertheless, Macron had considered appointing the former Socialist and former prime minister and minister Cazeneuve, but was unable to persuade even a section of the left, in the form of the Socialists, his long-standing party, to support this choice. On the left, concerns about Macron and the desire for a New Popular Front coalition ultimately prevailed. Some members of the Socialist Party were open to working with Macron, but ultimately, the party as a whole decided to pursue a different path. The victorious New Popular Front coalition suggested their joint candidate, Lucie Castets. An interesting possible development at the time was also discussed during the summer recess — the possibility of recruiting her from the left and fielding her as Macron’s candidate. Nevertheless, she demonstrated such independence that a potential takeover by the centre, which could be perceived as a move towards the right, was unsuccessful.

Following the unsuccessful discussions with the left, who had legitimate concerns about the president’s intentions, Macron was quick to recognise that, despite winning the left, he was not going to entrust anyone from this bloc with the post of prime minister. Therefore, the president began exploring potential candidates who could garner support from Le Pen and the Gaullists. His first choice was Xavier Bertrand, but there were some concerns from Marine Le Pen that made this difficult to accept. Supposedly, she was said to have suggested that she might allow a government to act that would change the law to favour her and bring France to the next election at the earliest constitutionally possible date.

It appears that there may be some potential for an agreement in the fact that Le Pen did not declare her support or vote for Barnier’s resignation. She indicated that Barnier appears to meet at least the first condition that was set, which was to respect the party and address National Unity deputies as other parties are addressed.

A new beginning for the right?

On the same day he was designated to lead the new government, France’s new Prime Minister Michel Barnier announced on that his priorities would be access to public services, security in daily life and – of course – immigration control. He also stressed the need for respect and to calm the mood in political life.

Speaking in front of the Prime Minister’s residence — the Palais Matignon — Barnier also listed education, jobs, and citizens’ living standards among his priorities. He announced that he would soon propose the names of new ministers to parliament and announce legislative plans. He spoke of a ‘new charter’ that would bring a ‘break’ with the past and change.

‘We will need (careful) listening and respect — a lot of respect, above all — between government and parliament,’ he said. He went on to add that it was about ‘respect towards all political forces’ represented in parliament.

Everything mentioned above, together with the reaction of the right, which will wait for actions and not judge by words, indicates that Michel Barnier, a conservative with long experience in French and European politics, could be the man who reconciles the Macron camp and Le Pen’s nationalists. If the left is not going to work along the president’s guidelines, why not try an opposite scenario? The presidential camp, i.e. via Édouard Philippe, has indicated at multiple occasions that this is a possible scenario.

What lines will the collaboration walk? Mainly on the issue of immigration, this is what will become bread and games for the new French ruling team, all dressed up in the form of a fight for France’s security and identity. Changes to the electoral system will also be possible. But what later? Concessions regarding socio-economic policies might be too challenging to swallow for the Macronist and Republican camps respectively.

All of this is more than important, after all, we are facing a political horizon with the upcoming election in 2027.

French standoff

At this point, it shall be recalled that neither the left (its four clubs have a total of 193 seats with Mélenchon’s LFI, 72, is the largest), nor the right (Le Pen 126, her ally Ciotti 16, the centre-right Gaullists 47), if counted together they have 189 votes, nor the three clubs of the Macron camp in the middle with 166 representatives. The required majority is 289 votes.

The prime minister is chosen by the president, and doesn’t need any kind of parliamentary support, nevertheless, Parliament has the option of dismissing the presidential nominee if a sufficient number of MPs express their support for a vote of no confidence. This resulted in Macron being unable to impose his candidate, which gave the president an opportunity to reflect for an extended period. Initially, the Olympics were cited as a reason for the delay, but even after the Olympics, it took several weeks before serious candidates for the new occupant of the Matignon Palace, the seat of the French prime ministers, began to emerge.

The stability of the government that Barnier will form now depends on the position that the political parties will take towards him. The left has already announced a vote of no confidence. It usually takes several days between the appointment of the prime minister and the announcement of the government’s composition. The French media forecasts in unison that this time the deadline will be prolonged due to political instability. After the July elections, the French parliament is divided between three rival political forces. What are their interests?

Technocratic nightmare

Here, it is worth noting what will hang as a potential doom upon us from the outset for the new government, a doom that was potentially known moments after the announcement of the results of the second round of the election. A technocratic government has been something that has been unimaginable until now in France, where the ruling classes have either selected left-wing maggots, such as Hollande, or established a neoliberal government, personified by Macron or Sarkozy.

But now, faced with the greatest polarisation in the recent history of the republic, a polarisation that does not allow the formation of any meaningful majority government, today the French president was forced to form such a government. Was this possible with the left? There was probably a chance of it, but a poor one. The unifying force of the left, fearful, even despite slight flirtations with Macron, of the cannibalisation of its own parties by the centre, prevented a move in this direction. Thus, the neoliberals have turned to the right, using the figure of the old Republican bureaucrat.

On Macron’s side, the intentions are clear. The idea is to move to the right and thus gain legitimacy for his power. The question is not only how long the potential political fuel he will draw from this situation allows him to do so, but also how he is going to capitalise it in three years’ time.

And what does Marine Le Pen have to say about this? Paradoxically, going for a little cooperation with Macron may not be so bad for her. Why? She would certainly play a role of someone responsible for the country. She will suggest that she is not what the left is, and furthermore, whatever problems this government has will not be her fault, she is not the one who set it up after all. Nonetheless, she will be able to gain politically from what will happen in it. After all, it will enable her to pursue her own agenda.

The Left, on the other hand, has been forced into unity, again, ironically, by the strength of its opponents rather than by the strength of its own unity. But again, this situation seems to be helping it. A government without electoral legitimacy, a government that is a de facto betrayal of the republican front, is a dream government to fight against Le Pen and Macron, who will now, not as before the elections, openly cooperate. The question is, will the left know how to exploit this situation politically? Probably this is what a big part of the voters expects. Looking at the French left’s recent fortunes, one may doubt it.

The final question is the question of the synthesis of Macron’s and Le Pen’s interests, where this might lead. Unity is only apparent on migrant issues and those concerning security, but what about social issues? Who will pay for the successes of this government from groups that are socially organised in any way. Will we see a fight against the trade unions again, and how much political fuel could be taken from another anti-social turns?

Will further black swans, like the riots a year ago after the murder of a boy with an immigrant background, end up helping this government to survive, or will they bring it down. And, moreover, to the profit of whom?

These are all open questions and all the political forces involved in this impasse are aware of it. The election of a right-wing bureaucrat only temporarily clarifies the situation, but paradoxically does not at all answer the question of what to do next about the political crisis in which France finds itself.

However, one thing is certain. This show is worth our attention.

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