Cabinet of national consensus: how pragmatism is redefining reforms in Iran
Shamsoddin Shariati, LSE Blogs, Middle Eastern Centre, 5 September 2024
The new president’s entire cabinet was approved by the Iranian parliament two weeks ago. What do we know about this new cabinet, and how did President Pezeshkian, a reformist figure, manage to secure approval from a predominantly conservative parliament? Is the new government a promise of change and improvement in Iran’s domestic crises and international relations?
For the first time in Iran’s history, the newly elected president transparently assembled an advisory council consisting of well-known experts, academics, and politicians. This council formed several specialized committees tasked with nominating the most qualified candidates for ministerial positions based on merit. The head of the council overseeing these procedures was Javad Zarif, a reputable reformist figure and former Iranian Foreign Minister.
After President Pezeshkian nominated his cabinet, many reformists and journalists expressed disappointment, believing the cabinet was far from what they had expected or voted for. Zarif, who played a significant role in Pezeshkian’s electoral campaign, stated that 10 out of the 19 ministers were among the nominees recommended by the council. Subsequently, Zarif resigned from his position as Strategic Deputy to the President, citing his failure to ‘fulfill the promises of including women, young people, and ethnic minorities in the cabinet’. He also apologised for his inability to pursue the election campaign promises within the ‘corridors of domestic politics.’
Over the past four decades, reformists in Iran have typically pursued idealistic changes, radical narratives, and significant political reforms, often encountering strong resistance from the conservative establishment. This resistance has led to widespread disillusionment among the populace, who have seen little meaningful change despite multiple attempts to elect reformists to government or parliament. Beyond the early efforts of President Muhammad Khatami (1997–2005), the most recent attempt to bring reformists to power was marked by the election of President Rouhani’s administration (2013–21) and the 2016 parliamentary elections. Both faced considerable obstacles from the conservative establishment and hard-liners, ultimately hindering their success. This growing disillusionment is reflected in the voter turnout for the 2021 and two rounds of the 2024 presidential elections, which saw respectively 49%, 40%, and 50% participation – the lowest in more than four decades.
However, this time, reformists have adopted a more pragmatic approach, opting for gradual change rather than radical reforms and narrative. They have sought to compromise and build consensus with moderate forces and majority of establishment. It appears that President Pezeshkian has struck a deal with the conservative establishment, choosing half of the cabinet, particularly those related to economic, foreign, and health ministries, from his council’s nominees, with the other half selected to appease conservatives.
President Pezeshkian correctly prioritised addressing Iran’s economic crisis and foreign affairs, selecting Abdolnaser Hemmati and Ahmad Meidari, both well-educated technocrats and economists with successful track records, for the Ministry of Economy and Ministry of Social Welfare, respectively. Additionally he appointed Ali Tayebnia, a well-known economist and former Minister of the Economy, as his chief advisor. It is worth noting that during Tayebnia’s tenure as Minister of the Economy, Iran’s inflation rate dropped dramatically from 35% to less than 10% between 2013 and 2017. This new government’s economic team, therefore, holds promise in addressing current economic deficits, high inflation, and the deteriorating conditions of the middle class and poor.
Furthermore, Abbas Araghchi was selected as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Araghchi, who served as the political deputy at the foreign ministry from 2017 to 2021 under Javad Zarif, was instrumental in finalising the nuclear agreement with the P5+1 nations (the UN Security Council’s five permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States; plus Germany.) He, along with President Pezeshkian, advocates for removing Iran from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. FATF is a global organisation that tackles money laundering, terrorist financing, and weapons proliferation financing, and its blacklist identifies countries with serious strategic deficiencies in these areas. Clearing Iran’s name from the FATF blacklist could pave the way for lifting sanctions and restoring financial and commercial interactions between Iran and the rest of the world.
Moreover, Mohammad Reza Zafarghandi was appointed as the Minister of Health. Zafarghandi is the former president of the Islamic Republic of Iran Medical Council NGO, elected by its membership of around 300,000 healthcare professionals. His appointment was supported by previous health ministers, both reformist and conservative, indicating his competence for the role. Additionally, Zafarghandi has been an advocate for women’s rights, frequently criticised the arrest of protesters and the firing of students and professors during previous protests – specifically the woman, life, freedom movement – and consistently supported greater freedom and fairer elections in Iran.
These are a few stand-out examples of the new cabinet members. As we can see, relatively competent ministers have been appointed to high-priority ministries. It is important to understand that reforms and improvements in a political system do not occur suddenly or all at once through radical changes. Such changes often face resistance from elites who benefit from the current system. Instead, reforms should proceed step by step, with each step forward requiring consensus-building among stakeholders and players.
Though some may feel disappointed at this point, thinking that the reformists have abandoned their ideals or are simply seeking more power without making meaningful changes, it can be argued that this pragmatic approach, with a balanced composition of the cabinet, can yet yield results.
It is promising that, after decades of ups and downs, Iranian reformists have learned to be pragmatic and play by the rules of power and politics. They have learned to compromise, build consensus, create alliances, shape majorities against hard-liners, negotiate, and bargain – key tenets of pragmatism – while also maintaining the trust of the people who vote for them. They have learned to focus on the most critical issues and to make trade-offs on other matters with their rivals to gain their support. Time will tell if this approach can allow Iran to begin addressing its problems one step at a time.
Photo: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian with his cabinet selection at the parliament in Tehran, August 2024 (source: Hammihan online)
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