Bulgaria’s political crisis demonstrates, among other things, Sofia’s lack of regional and EU ambitions

Malgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat

Vladimir Mitev is a Bulgarian-Romanian speaking journalist, who is also one of the founders of the Cross-border Talks media based in Poland. He is known for his analysis of Romanian issues for the Bulgarian media and of Bulgarian issues for the Romanian media. He is also the founder of The Bridge of Friendship – a multilingual Bulgarian-Romanian blog promoting mutual acquaintance and “dynamic identity” in Southeastern Europe. 

Vladimir offered his perspective on the Bulgarian political crisis and its significance for national, regional and EU politics. In his view, both Western Europe and Bulgaria have forces that promote social transformation and progressive change, but also forces that have a vision for Southeastern Europe based on the idea that there must be stability and order, and that local unprivileged people shouldn’t cause unnecessary trouble at the national and international level as money, goods and people pass through the region. And it looks like the EC is about to base itself on stabilocracy again in Bulgaria.

On the other hand, politics and media talk in Bulgaria in recent years have turned many Bulgarians into cynics who don’t believe in big abstract ideas, but only in making money or accumulating more power for themselves and their in-groups in the never-ending inter-Bulgarian competition. In these conditions it is difficult for something authentic and new to appear in social life. All too often, the projects and people who accumulate social capital in Bulgaria turn out to have been aligned from the very beginning with some political segments of the Bulgarian political system. 

The long-term inability to form a government leads to a situation in which Bulgaria’s neighbors avoid negotiating and signing agreements with the caretaker government, claiming that they prefer a normal government as their partner. Bulgaria’s pace of reform and receipt of funds from the National Recovery and Resilience Plan is also severely hampered. Most likely, Bulgaria will get a less significant portfolio for its Euro Commissioner. These are just some of the signs that Bulgaria’s presence outside its borders and in Europe is also in crisis at this moment. 

Good afternoon everyone listening to Cross-Border Talks. This is another edition of our podcast, our regular video program in which we will discuss the ongoing political crisis in Bulgaria. Today I am not joined by an external guest, but I will ask questions about Bulgaria, Bulgarian politics and Bulgarian society to my friend, colleague and co-founder of the Cross Border Talks project, Vladimir Mitev.

My name is Małgorzata Kurbaczewska-Figat, I am calling you from Katowice, Poland. And at this moment I would like to remind you that Cross-Border Talks is available on YouTube, SoundCloud, Spotify, all the main social platforms. So to not miss any of our episodes, just subscribe there and comment on what you have heard and seen.

So, Vladimir, hello, hello, thank you for agreeing to record this extraordinary interview.

Thank you for the invitation.

Well, as we can see, the Bulgarians are going to vote again this fall. In theory, on Monday, July 22, 2024, the Bulgarian president, Rumen Radev, will hand over the mandate to form a government, the second political force in the Bulgarian parliament.

But it is now clear to all observers of Bulgarian politics that We Continue the Change – Democratic Bulgaria, the coalition that will get the chance to form a government, will pass up this opportunity without making any attempt to form a government. This means that the chances of forming a government without early elections will be only the third mandate that the President can give to any political force.

But no one really expects that this third attempt will be successful either. Bulgaria is in a crisis, or has been in a crisis for some time, which is unlike anything that has happened in any other European country. We have many polarized countries in the European Union, but what is happening in Bulgaria has reached a level of total impossibility, not only to have a coherent vision of the country’s policy, both internal and external, but even to agree on who could head a government administration, who could govern and steer the state, even for a short period of time.

Vladimir, I would like to ask you how it happened. How did Bulgaria arrive at this moment?

It’s a big question, and perhaps it needs a longer answer. In short, I have to say that for a long time Bulgaria had a stabilocratic type of government. Maybe you know this term from Florian Bieber, stabilocracy, which he says is characteristic of the socio-political model of the Balkan countries in the Merkel era.

Boyko Borisov was the long-time prime minister of Bulgaria, who was the face of the EU-backed Bulgarian stabilocracy. In 2020 there were huge protests against him and against the then chief prosecutor, Ivan Geshev. Finally, after that, came some fluid political period in Bulgarian politics with the rise of new parties. The parties that appeared were not standard parties with an ideology, structure or some great idea behind them, but they were more like political projects. This is even the word that was used to describe them. 

And what happened after that was perhaps very much in line with the international situation where there was a war in Ukraine and the Joe Biden administration divided the world into democracies and countries that do not share the rule-based order. So there were many levels of polarization. 

Maybe the polarization around the war in Gaza has been less significant in Bulgarian society in recent months, because somehow our elites have been traditionally aligned with Israel in recent years. But other polarizations have really come to Bulgaria.

And we saw that internally, there was a contest between different businessmen, their international contacts, their media, their influence in the state administration and law enforcement, et cetera. And there was also an international context. So there was a lot of confrontation and politicization on many fronts.

But at the same time, there was really a certain lack of political substance in what was being discussed, because the parties, for example, to a large extent didn’t really have a party life. They were more like cadre pools for state administration. And ordinary people did not really join a party because they shared a particular view of society, but perhaps because they wanted to get an appointment in some local municipal office or in some other way to get some economic benefit.

So the answer, as I said, is huge. Maybe I’m just sharing a little bit of the reasons why this crisis has come about. But really, I feel that there is this crisis in the sense that we have so much mutual contestation and domination in society that life, simple life, normal existence is somehow significantly challenged and something new can’t grow. Because in order to grow, you need not only power, but you also need connection to life.

You also partially answered my next question, which is mainly about the relationship between the political crisis and normal life, as you put it. In other words, how do social relations in Bulgaria influence the shape of political life? It is said that people elect politicians, so politicians are just the emanation of what people expect from those in power.

If you want specialists, you vote for specialists. But if you want populists, or people who just make noise around themselves, or those who use politics to make money, then such people win elections, which are elected by the people. So my question is: what do Bulgarians expect from the political class?

And do you think that ordinary Bulgarians have been let down by the political class? Or rather that Bulgarians vote for people who represent the things they want to get? You have already mentioned that people in Bulgaria join parties not because of an idea, but in the hope of some economic gain.

So what is the relationship between this approach of ordinary Bulgarians to politics and the form that this politics takes?

As a continuation of what I discussed earlier, I think that many people in Bulgaria are becoming cynical about politics, media and public life. And that’s one of the reasons why, in their relationships, they might be looking for ways to make money or to increase their power over the people or groups that they are competing with. And I don’t want to go into great detail, but let me say that I live in a provincial town or city where I certainly notice that it is important which party you belong to, which groups you belong to, sometimes or often are associated with certain political or economic lobbies.

So I have the feeling that people are very, very pragmatic, even in a surprising way, pragmatic in a very narrow sense, I would say, because you can also be pragmatic if you take into account certain values or certain theory or certain ideology, if you like, or certain abstract thinking. But I think people are really very much thinking about how they can solve concrete problems here and now. So, for example, I think in many areas outside of Sofia it really matters who governs the municipality or who has a chance to win.

And I have the feeling, and I’ve heard this many times over the years, that whoever doesn’t have power doesn’t really matter and just offers to talk. So people have a certain encouragement to vote only for people who can really get access to power and then that power will be used for the benefit of those who have voted or are somehow connected to it or have relatives connected to it. I don’t know if I’m giving a very good answer, but maybe you get the idea that these big ideas that can be shaped by political science and can be promoted by western or international, in fact any serious media, are very much reduced to something very concrete, very grounded.

And I have the feeling that if someone wants to make a change in Bulgaria on the basis of ideas, it is a huge challenge, because everything can very easily be reduced to something very material, very concrete, very tiny, as opposed to these big ideas that we all deal with and that we all promote in Europe.

So I have to ask, is the failure of the Bulgarian policy also a failure of the Bulgarian Western allies from the European Union, of which Bulgaria is a member, or of Germany and France, which on different levels have involved Bulgaria in their diplomatic activity in Southeastern Europe, or whose business has a lot of connections with business in Bulgaria. Because we all know that the European Union likes to talk a lot about democracy, about freedom of speech, about the vibrant political life in a liberal democracy, and last but not least about the rule of law. And the picture that you draw really shows none of this, and people who are more familiar with the history of Boyko Borissov and his stabilocracy in Bulgaria would certainly agree that this was not the rule of law that the European Union proposes as the best order for organizing political and social life.

So I have to ask you, is Bulgaria’s failure also a failure of its Western partners? And the second related question: when and where does the failure begin? Should we look for the roots of the failure in the transition period or even before?

Thank you for the big questions. They are of the magnitude that the greatest intellectuals and the greatest experts on the Orient or the Balkans or West-East or periphery-center relations have to answer.

When you mentioned Boyko Borissov and stabilocracy, I immediately remembered that during the protests against Borissov a few years ago, the report “Binding the Guardian” appeared signed by Albena Azmanova, who is a political scientist. She was at Kent University at the time. She basically accused the Juncker European Commission of being complicit in the violations of the rule of law that took place under Borissov. 

Personally, maybe I can’t so easily accuse just one party of wrongdoing, because I have the feeling that in Bulgaria right now there is no great ambition or curiosity or desire to move closer to Western Europe, let’s say. And at the same time, if one country or one side doesn’t have great ambition, maybe the other side doesn’t have great ambition either.

And I can understand why there is less interest from Western Europe towards Bulgaria in comparison to Romania. Maybe one reason is that Bulgaria just doesn’t have the natural resources that Romania has. So, somehow, of course, the stakes in Bulgaria are not as high for economically focused lobbies or groups in Western Europe.

But of course there are many other reasons why the relationship is not as dynamic as I would like it to be. I can imagine that when one side does not have enough interest, it is always reciprocated with indifference. And now we might be moving towards another era or period in which Boyko Borissov could be the European face of Bulgaria. At least it looks that way.

He keeps winning elections, even if no government is formed after that. And we also just saw that Germany and the EC signed this agreement with Serbia for the exploitation of lithium in Serbia, which again seems to put the emphasis on economic relations as opposed to values, change and abstract ideas with regard to our region. So it’s really a very complex issue.

I don’t want to work with a fixed understanding of what is Western Europe and what is Bulgaria. I think in every area there is a tendency to look for change and to look for better standards, if you will, or to look for new experiences, internationalization. But at the same time there is a tendency in every region that tries to rely on the status quo, on security, perhaps, or on stability, so that money can flow without problems, and then the people who are in a subordinate position should just not make a lot of trouble.

So, you know, there’s this understanding that maybe we need a good policeman for our region, and that’s all. And these two understandings, one based on transformation and one based on stability, are in constant competition. I’m not happy that stability may be coming back, but maybe it has good sides, and we just have to be very precise in our conclusions. So I don’t want to accuse only one side, and I think there is a progressive element in each side.

I just hope that better times will come for change, because in my region we see generations and generations of people becoming cynical, and I think it is not European to be cynical.

Oh, it definitely is not. And I could agree with you that you can’t simply say that the European Union kicked Bulgaria into the abyss, or on the other hand that Bulgaria didn’t want to benefit from its presence in the European Union, also in the field of values. Of course, there are European forces that stand for the progress of all regions, including Bulgaria and Romania, and there are others who were very happy with Boyko Borisov, and let me just remind you that the European People’s Party didn’t react to the protests in Bulgaria at all, because they were actually happy with Borisov, who was part of the European People’s Party, and they weren’t really enthusiastic about the prospect of his government being overthrown by some young anti-corruption-minded people. So, indeed, the relationship is complex, and perhaps we could talk more about it on another occasion. But now I’d like to look at another aspect of the relationship between the European Union and Bulgaria.

With the lack of a stable government in Bulgaria, how are the current relations between Brussels and Sofia developing? And in a recent report of yours for Radio Romania, you mentioned that there are not tensions, but talks on the line, as for example Bulgaria is trying to renegotiate certain parts of the National Recovery and Resilience Plans, including such important parts as those concerning the fair transition of industrial areas. So my question is, what changes would the Bulgarian elites like to introduce into the agreement, and what are other issues that are now important in the relationship between Bulgaria and the European Union?

Yes, there have been media reports, for example in Dnevnik in June, that Bulgaria really wants to renegotiate some aspects of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan related to the green transition. Basically, it wants to reduce the level of commitments it has to make, to reduce certain indicators, so that it can eventually do what is necessary in the time that remains. A lot of time has been lost, also because of this political crisis and the inability to form a stable government.

I’m also aware that the Bulgarian European Commissioner, Iliana Ivanova, has warned that there is a real risk that Bulgaria will not receive the funds from the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, because by now it should have made the reforms that are required for four transactions, four payments, but it has only received one payment, and it still hasn’t made what is necessary for the second one. Imagine if there is a renegotiation of the recovery and resilience plan, then more time will be lost in negotiations.

Another issue that is important is that Bulgaria has been trying to join the eurozone, and we see that Bulgaria’s entry into the eurozone, the date of entry, has been pushed further and further into the future because some of the criteria, like inflation, are still not being met. But it gives a certain impression, because periodically expectations are created that maybe even in 2024 or 2025 we could, should or would have joined, and the date is moving further and further into the future. 

I think that the difficulty of forming a government in Bulgaria is that we are not helping to achieve this goal, and even other problems that appear as a result of this lack of clear direction of the country, the foreign policy of Bulgaria may have some difficulties. 

So in general, I can even quote Vessela Tcherneva from the European Council on Foreign Relations, who gave an interview to Bulgarian National Radio today, that it is expected that the Bulgarian Commissioner in the next European Commission will have a less important portfolio. In a way, this is also a reflection of the Bulgarian lobbying capacity or the importance of Bulgaria in the European Union at the moment. The last conclusions are my comments on why the Bulgarian Commissioner might not be a really important one.

Okay, I’d like to go a little bit more into the foreign policy issue, and I’d like to ask how the chaos in the formation of the government is affecting Bulgaria’s ability to be active in the region. I know that you are very fond and you are also involved on many levels in building bridges between Bulgaria and Romania, not on the political level but on the human level, but now I would like to ask you, what are the relations if Bulgaria is practically ungovernable? And Romania is not the only neighbor or partner of Bulgaria that Bulgaria should have relations with in the region.

So what is going on, for example, in Bulgarian-Greek relations, or does Bulgaria have a substantial position in the strategic situation on the Black Sea? And what about relations with North Macedonia, which have been strained for a long time?

Okay, I’ll try to say something about each of these directions. 

First of all, regarding the bridges between Bulgaria and Romania, my impression from the last months and years is that maybe only human bridges are possible, and even they are not so easy to build. But the human bridges at least basically depend on the ability of people to connect and to trust each other. Regarding the infrastructure projects that have been announced – and both countries have had some bold ambitions to build more bridges between themselves and the Danube – in fact there is only one infrastructure project that is really being worked on now. But it is still at the level of feasibility study, and it will last until 2026. This study will be completed by then. 

I am also aware that the lack of a normal government in Sofia is seen as a certain obstacle from the Romanian point of view, because there is a desire if something it to be signed with Bulgaria regarding the bridge, to sign it with the normal government, which really clearly represents a political will, and it is clear who politically supports it. The caretaker government that is now being formed is not seen as sufficiently representative, or perhaps as having sufficient agency, public strength or political will behind it. 

On another occasion, recently, we had this similar position by the Macedonian Prime Minister Hristian Mitskoski. Perhaps our listeners know that he has been having a hard stance against the introduction of the constitutional changes in Macedonia, and that the Bulgarians are included as a constituent people in the Macedonian constitution. These constitutional changes are necessary to start the process of negotiations with the EU. Recently representatives of the Macedonian government said that they are not willing to talk with a caretaker government. They want a real standard government in Sofia as a partner. 

And on Greece, I would say that perhaps in the absence of a clear political will, the importance of military or security institutions is growing, because perhaps our listeners also know that recently Romania, Bulgaria and Greece signed this agreement for a so-called “military Schengen”, which is basically an agreement that should facilitate the access of military equipment and troops between the three countries – allied NATO troops, of course. There is also a lot of talk about new infrastructure being built between Greece, Bulgaria and Romania to facilitate both civilian and military transport, and that it will be built with EU money. 

So in this respect I would say that they may have their own subjectivity in matters of democracy and security, and they may even sometimes act without the need for a party to back them up and support them, something that can also be seen in the Black Sea, regarding the cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey. The three countries recently launched a naval mission to clear the Black Sea of floating mines. This mission was agreed upon under the previous government of Nikolay Denkov. 

It is also a sign of a general tendency that security sectors between countries in the region, especially NATO countries, cooperate easier than, for example, other areas of governance where the standard political will remains important. Also, as I said, at the level of people, the need for connections is important, but again, I think it’s not easy to happen when there are no traditional ties and contacts between nations.

It’s very interesting what you say about security organs and armies continuing to cooperate despite the crisis, and how this factor of the defense factor, the strategic factor, has its own dynamic. This is also a topic that we might discuss later in another interview or even with another interviewee, because the Black Sea region is crucial for the security not only of Southeastern Europe, but of Europe as a whole. 

In my last question I would like to come back to Bulgaria’s domestic politics and dynamics and ask you what you expect to happen if Bulgarians really do vote for another early election this year or next year, you mentioned in one of your publications that more new pro-business and patriotic parties could emerge. 

Bulgaria already had an ultra-patriotic party, the Revival Party, which was quite successful in previous elections, so I would like to ask you, is Bulgaria turning to the sovereignist current, as a number of European countries did in the last European elections? And what is new about a pro-business party, since every party in post-transition Bulgaria has been pro-business in one way or another?

Yes, perhaps I should say that often in Bulgaria when somebody accumulates certain social capital, like being an influencer on the Internet, or organizing certain events, being popular in certain regions, etc., it turns out that he or she is being integrated into the political system. And it may turn out that even before the person or the organization started making this social capital, he or she was somehow aligned with a certain fragment or tendency in our political system. Some people who gathered social support before they became official politicians seem to be somehow associated with the Bulgarian Socialist Party, not as a party but as a tendency, which is maybe a little bit different, it’s broader than the party itself. And others have people who come from Democratic Bulgaria, etc., and later become politicians from this tendency. 

I say this because recently there have been some “grassroots” projects, for example, trying to connect young people with employers, or trying to promote certain patriotic values in society. And there has been a discussion that these projects are somehow viewed positively by President Radev, who has also recently made a lot of statements that the political system in Bulgaria is in a big crisis, and some people believe that he might somehow want to use this crisis to increase his political influence by supporting certain parties or, I don’t know, in some other way that we have to see. 

There is this pending issue that there are constitutional reforms that have limited his control over the caretaker governments. If these constitutional changes are stopped by the Constitutional Court, then maybe Radev would have come back through the caretaker governments in the future. So there is this expectation that some political scientists are creating that maybe Radev will play a more important role in Bulgarian politics in the coming months, and maybe this is also in line with a possible Trump victory in the White House. 

I must remind you that Radev rose in Bulgarian politics around the time of Trump’s victory 8 years ago. Radev and Trump somehow both rely on some kind of patriotism, let’s say, or some kind of connection between army and business.

Maybe I’m very vague in my guess what will happen, but these are some processes that maybe others are observing and we have to follow what will happen. In any case, we see more and more parties which are not real parties, which are maybe just one or two men. Very strange parties are appearing in Bulgarian politics lately, they even enter the Parliament and immediately after entering the Parliament they fall apart. And each of their representatives reports to the others. Each of them has some compromising material and facts about the others that he/she is leaking. 

So I’m not very hopeful about what will follow. But in any case, my guess is that whatever happens in the White House will be reflected somehow in Bulgarian politics. And if Trump wins again, there will certainly be people who will try to play the role of conservatives or patriots or some people who are maybe also libertarian in a way. So this big ideological segment of ideas that American Republicans represent will certainly find some representation in Bulgaria.

It’s definitely not easy to be hopeful about the future of Bulgaria, and I don’t want to just say that we’re waiting for a change for the better, because the change for the better in Bulgaria, and even to resolve this current crisis on a very basic level, to resolve the crisis so that Bulgaria finally has a government, is an extremely difficult and extremely complex task, and yet at the end of the interview I would like to say that I wish all the best to those forces in Bulgaria who really stand for change, and to those people in Bulgaria who really want their country to be a better, more livable place.

Thank you very much, Vladimir, for being with us today. Thank you to everyone who follows Cross-Border Talks and listened to the interview. We are open to your questions, suggestions and comments.

Use the comments section for that, and don’t forget to subscribe to Cross-Border Talks on the platforms where we present it. Thanks again and have a good day.

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