The New Popular Front, or the Old Third Way?
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The surprise victory of the Nouveau Front Populaire in France showed that the left had been able to count on some votes of the liberal electorate of the presidential camp, even if its representatives were more than divided over who their constituents should vote for in the second round of the Gaullist electoral system. Édouard Philippe, Gabriel Attal, just to mention current and former prime ministers, each suggested something different to the voters. The magnitude of the victory, although so large only because of France’s electoral system, has turned some cards over. It turns out that the magnitude of the success was able to simultaneously unite the presidential camp, which was, however, playing only for their own pensions, or political inheritance. At the same time, all the guns of the French media and the right wing remained aimed the leftist forces.
The New Popular Front or NFP, a coalition of political groups hurriedly assembled less than a month ago, crushed hopes for Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National to hold a definitive victory in France.
Founded rapidly on the June 10, literally moments after the European elections and Macron’s decision to hold early parliamentary vote, it has always been a rather wobbly structure.
We have already covered the breakup of the NUPES, an earlier left-wing coalition in France. Long story short, the Nouvelle Union populaire écologique et sociale was destroyed because of the centre-left leanings of Les Écologistes and Parti Socialiste, as well as due to the difficult nature of Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of La France Insoumise (LFT), to say the least. Moreover, there was an important split over policies and statements concerning the genocide in Gaza and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Front emerged since none of the parties had any chances to get a significant share of votes on their own, individually. Only in an alliance they could keep on being a political factor, given the first-past-the-post electoral system imposed by de Gaulle against communists in the 50s. The previous problems pushed them to sign an agreement on Gaza-Ukraine stance, anti-Russian and anti-genocidal. They also decided not to push Mélenchon as their prime minister candidate. Ultimately, he did not run at all, and the NFP did not have any leading candidate.
The LFI after the elections has 74 deputies, if it gets along with François Ruffin and his splitters, it will reach 77. Before the elections, LFI representation had 77. In a word, the formation is standing still. Yes, it is still the strongest group on the left, but it no longer dominates so clearly over the other groupings. The Socialists—Macron’s former party—have significantly strengthened their share, from 31 deputies to 59 and possibly 69, if they get along with the centre-left soloists. In addition, the Socialists did well in the European elections, just 0.8% short of overtaking Macron’s list. Les Écologistes, or the French Greens, also strengthened slightly during the parliamentary elections, with the total of all their factions now at 33, up from the previous 23. Only the Communists, of the Parti Communiste Français, emerged from the elections weakened, losing 8 of their previous 22 seats. Their leader, Fabien Roussel, running from the Nord region, the former heart of French industry, now a shadow of its former glory, did not win a place in the National Assembly.
Why switch to centre-left?
In a word, the centre-left and third-roaders won, consolidating their position within the leftist alliance. Why did this happen?
First, this is the result of the anti-Mélenchon campaign, which has been taking place since 2017, ever since he began to be seriously considered as a potential president of the Fifth Republic. His movement, born on the streets of French cities during Hollande’s anti-labor reforms — Nuit Debout, El Khomri Law, environmental fight, and so on — from its birth, posed a threat to a neoliberal regime and a republic conservative in its constitutional principles. His party, composed mainly of 30-something activists, had long relied on the youth and alter-globalist civic movements, skilfully replacing the base of the fading unions, or entering into cooperation with them, where the weakening of the socialists, still forceful in local politics — for example, are incomparably stronger than Le Pen’s nationalists — allowed it.
The attack on Mélenchon, intensified during the ongoing genocide of the Palestinians, that allowed the Socialists, Macron’s former party, to bounce back again and, together with the Greens, undermine the LFI’s leadership on the left. The influence of Zionist organizations is significant in France, and the huge Jewish diaspora, unlike in the US, generally supports Netanyahu’s policies. As a result, ‘fighting antisemitism’ turned into silencing critical voices in France, which was applied to LFI politicians, but also to journalists. Many of those who spoke on Gaza in different way than Tel Aviv would like, were simply expelled from the French media.
Any hopes?
Neither the Greens nor the Socialists would be as strong as they are now without the attack on the LFI. What’s more, it was the intercession of Macron, Edouard Phillipe and a multitude of other apparatchiks of the presidential camp that allowed them to expand their holdings so significantly now. The leaders of the presidential camp urged their voters not to vote for LFI candidates in the second round, even if they would be the only effective choice against the nationalist candidate.
The strength of the Socialists comes from their immense local forces and traditions, but the failure of Hollande and his disastrous presidency, will not allow them to be an independent entity on the left for long. There are too many bad feelings about that time among the working voters. In addition, the moderate left is not popular among the youngest French people. Here the LFI leads the way. Also the trade unions can hardly be considered a stable base for one party. The fragility of their political identity was already experienced in the 1990s by the Communists, who took their main asset from the ranks of the CGT. Today, this strong labour confederation which showed considerable militancy last year, supports the Left more broadly rather than the Communists specifically, let alone the Socialists, who facilitated mass lay-offs and wage cuts under the last presidency.
The Greens, on the other hand, take their support from the petty bourgeois intelligentsia or people who could potentially vote for Macron and his camp. So they could fight in the future for more support, but this is a song of the future.
In a word, it is difficult to talk about entirely independent political forces here.
Game changer?
Many thought that President Emmanuel Macron could be compelled to live in “cohabitation” with an opposition cabinet following the dissolution of the National Assembly on June 9. It looked logical that he would be obliged to create some kind of coalition format. That, however, seems of being more distant rather than closer in the light of his letter published on the 10 July. Macron stated that the “people” wanted to see the Republican Front “put into practice through action” in further opposition to the nationaliss. He argues that this reading of the election results obligates him to establish the parameters for talks at the Palais-Bourbon to construct a “solid majority, necessarily plural” in his capacities as “protector of the higher interests of the nation” and “guarantor of the institutions and respect for your choice”.
Emmanuel Macron is calling on the parties to make “compromises” to construct the “broad coalition”. According to him, this had to involve “political forces that identify with republican institutions, the rule of law, parliamentarianism, a European orientation and the defence of French independence”. That, of course, excludes both the extreme right and LFI, which is accused by the presidential camp of being anti-parliamentarian, despite all existing proofs. In fact, it is the left that proposes a proportional vote, that is much closer to democratic standards than de Gaulle’s electoral machinery.
It will be difficult to unite sharply opposed groups that seek to represent a different vision for government than Emmanuel Macron’s two five-year mandates, especially with three years until the 2027 presidential election. This is especially true since, as the President of the Republic cautions, the alliance must “guarantee the greatest possible institutional stability”. The head of state is calling on elected officials to choose “their country above their party, the nation above their ambition” to succeed in creating this majority, something he has not been able to accomplish before 2022. This was his way of emphasizing that the political parties, not him, would be accountable if France turned out to remain without a stable government.
This is, of course, an extremely skilful ploy to save face – in the face of the disaster that has been unleashed on France.
In his letter the president reminds us of one of his few remaining powers: he “will decide on the appointment of the Prime Minister”, “in the light of these principles”, he says, citing Article 8 of the Constitution. He said that it will take “a little time” to make this choice. At this point, “the current government will continue to exercise its responsibilities, and will then be responsible for current affairs in accordance with republican tradition” , he stated. Thus, in response to criticism from the left and right accusing him of “hijacking the institutions” by rejecting Gabriel Attal’s resignation from the cabinet, Emmanuel Macron is addressing the issue without providing a timeline. Politically clever, but not exactly democratic.
So far, so good
Leaders of the NFP are demanding to be handed the mission of forming the next government and implement their shared agenda for “rupture” with the Macron administration. Here, however, there is some disunity; it is known that LFI coalition partners will not support Melenchon as a candidate for the post. Hence, Melenchon’s party has fielded Clemence Guetté, a 33-year-old LFI deputy leader, co-head of the party’s laboratory of ideas, and an MP from Val-de-Marne. Her challenger was the Socialist leader, 55-years old, cabinet politician Olivier Faure. All of this was actually sabotaged by Macron, who’s holding his presidential powers, making it impossible for the left to appoint a prime minister on its own. In the end, the micro-wars on the left looked like a kindergarten children’s game interrupted by a stern and enigmatic father, the president.
Nonetheless, the Left stands unshaken for the moment, and does not give public expression to the fact that it is eager for a marriage that could again divide its ranks. Moreover, there are more and more contradictory messages coming out of the camp of the president himself, making it easier for the left to maintain stability. The split in Macron’s party is visible, especially on the right. The Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin declared he would never work with the Ecologists, and Horizons President Edouard Philippe admitted to having a “cordial” dinner with Marine Le Pen. He pleaded for the formation of a bloc that would lean right. After all, the smaller right-wing parties were Macron’s allies until the early elections.
So, the main question that remains for us is whether the left will be united, or will it divide and be fooled by Macron’s possible mumbo jumbo? The question of causality also remains open, to what extent unity or divorce will be a sovereign decision and to what extent the context will force the left to do so.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that for Macron, an alliance with the left would be more beneficial. Meeting some of her social demands relating to public spending, pensions or the minimum wage could not only act as an economic stimulus, but could also whip up support for the nationalists. Meanwhile, the left would need to face tough questions from its voters who might be scared and hateful of Marine Le Pen, but who took it to the streets against Macron numerous times and clearly do not trust him. And, even if the Gaullist political system allowed the ‘Republican Front’ to triumph, the nationalists are still the biggest single political force in the country, and the number of deputies in the National Assembly will not change this.
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