NATO in Madrid – with an eye on Russia, but with China in mind. The reverse-Kissinger moment?

LARICS, 1 July 2022

A Romanian expert discussion on the outcomes of the NATO summit in Madrid took place at the end of June 2022. The organisers of the debate on Thursday 30 June were LARICS (Laboratory for Analysis of Information Warfare and Strategic Communication), the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy and the German Marshall Fund Romania.

The participants were Prof. Dan Dungaciu, Director ISPRI – Romanian Academy and Radu Magdin, Director Smartlink Communications. The moderator of the debate was Claudiu Lucaci, expert in strategic communication. The debate can be watched here (in Romanian).

Note by Cross-border Talks: Dan Dunagciu and Radu Magdin discuss about the prospects that West could be looking to reposition itself in the world and what could this mean for the Eastern flank of NATO? How likely is it that the region’s relations with Russia are left to the Europeans, while the USA makes a pivot to Asia?

Also the Romanian positioning is being discussed. Which tendency prevails – the strong economic presence of Germany, France and Italy in Romania or the all-weather strong security ties to the USA? The visits of the leaders of Germany, France, Italy and Romania to Kiev could be a hint in this sense.

And with regards to chaning international situation and Romania’s possible role in it, here are some thoughts by Dan Dungaciu on the issue of US-China relations and his country:

Black and white are not the favourite colours for politicians and analysts these days. The idea that the world is divided into democracies and non-democracies is a rather risky and unworkable idea – for example, to get rid of energy dependence on a “non-democracy” like Russia, the solution is to couple ourselves to “democracies” like Venezuela or Iran! Just one example. So black and white are not operable in the world we are heading for.

The world is entering into a pragmatism of realignment where everyone plays their own game. The idea has been raised that some states are trying to become hubs for someone else, i.e. to build up their own utility value. In this world, the game has to come from this perspective – what use value will you have? Although Romania seems too small for games, it is exactly in this period that you have to play to find a role of use. Remembering Kissinger, China and Russia, however small a role Romania played then, it played it then. Nixon in 1967 was in Romania, came back in 1969. Ceaușescu, who was in the US in 1970 and 1973, was publicly thanked for what he did for US-China relations. It was a success, beyond all other considerations.

Today, in theory, just as Romania can position itself at equal distance between the Americans and Europe and be credible, in the future, who knows, it could position itself at equal distance between the Asians and the Europeans and still be credible. This is a game we can try – with China and the West, if you set your mind to it, you can be halfway there.

What follows is the transcription of the discussion, which was translated and republished by Cross-border Talks with LARICS’ consent. The source of the text can be consulted in Romanian here at LARICS site.

Claudiu Lucaci: Today we will also talk about strategic communication, not only international relations and foreign policy. The play on words in the title “NATO – with an eye on Russia, but with China in mind” sums up pretty well what happened this week. NATO today is transforming, but the hot topic on everyone’s mind today is whether what we are seeing in NATO is an irreversible, long-lasting transformation in the decisions it takes and whether the threats are identified. Because the old concept didn’t talk explicitly about that. So here is the Russian Federation becoming a significant threat, and China is also seen as a “potential” adversary. So what exactly happened in Madrid?

The stakes of the NATO summit were the West’s positioning in the world

Dan Dungaciu: If I didn’t live on NATO’s Eastern Flank, so to speak, probably the most important wording in the new strategic concept has to do with NATO’s concern about the partnership between China and the Russian Federation, which almost radically changes the facts of the matter: “The strategic deepening of the partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undermine the rules-based international order are at odds with our values and interests.” This kind of mention in the strategic vision – including reflecting the importance of the “Indo-Pacific” space – puts the Madrid Summit on the big world map, not just on the NATO or Euro-Atlantic map. That, I think, is the big change, beyond mentioning the Black Sea – along with the Western Balkans – as a region of ‘strategic importance’.

If we look at the global scale, we see a NATO that is resizing itself, repositioning itself alongside practically all the institutions of the West and placing itself at the service of the most important stake that the West has in the current reconfiguration of the global world: maintaining its status as an important, decisive player in shaping the world order. We see a NATO with a message that is almost synchronous with what the G7 was saying, we talk about the EU, institutions that are repositioning themselves, because the West needs to find its place in this global world. NATO, G7, EU, etc. – all of these need to be seen as tools in defining that role.

We are talking about a West that, if we look strictly at the war in Ukraine, has been in a “West and the rest” paradigm, with the “rest” not taking the side of the West, with the West being almost the only explicit one in this matter. The West’s problems – as India’s foreign minister irritably but very significantly warned – are not “global problems”.

Therefore, in order to remain “global”, the West has to retreat not only in relation to Russia or China, but to almost the whole globe, it has to find a new positioning, and the signal about China is very important, because it suggests that the Ukraine episode and the relationship with Russia are only one part – for us the most important and dramatic part – of this global repositioning of the West for possibly even deeper confrontations in the future.

We are at the moment of a profound reassessment. And it is not just about the military dimension, it is about the political, strategic, economic, social, energy dimension. Everything needs to be rethought, repositioned. If we look at other messages we see that others are thinking from the same perspective – the Russian Federation turning to China, China somewhat protecting Russia is a profound change in the facts of the matter. In Moscow this idea of rupture is becoming present. We hear the monist Lavrov talking about “a new iron curtain”, i.e. a break from the West of Russia and a rewiring of Russia to the Asian world, with major consequences not only for Russia but also for the West…

Today we are in a situation somewhat diametrically opposed to what happened in the 1960s and 1970s, when the West disconnected from the Middle East energy source and hooked up to the Russian, then Soviet, energy source to which today’s Asians are hooking up. The West is jockeying for position, Russia is jockeying for position, and China is recalibrating its future strategies. So pretty much everything is changing – the NATO summit is just one element. NATO is just one of the instruments that is repositioning itself, here we are also talking about the G7 and the European Union.

And if there will be a peace in Ukraine, there has been talk about a peace similar to the one in Korea, it is possible that we will have consequences similar to that Korean peace when we witnessed the strategic repositioning including the US in relation to the Cold War. After the ceasefire in Korea everything was redrawn, NATO and America changed their attitude then, they became “global” in the sense of the strategic rediscovery of Asia and the Pacific, and it is possible that we are in a similar phase and we have to think what will be the consequences of this pivot to Asia and think who is going to Asia? Crucial question for us. Does all of NATO go, does just the US go, does it go together with the Europeans to Asia, or do they try to cooperate and distribute their tasks like “the Europeans stay here and the Americans go to Asia rather”? Because all these things will have possible consequences on Romania’s domestic policy in the short and medium term.

Claudiu Lucaci: All these images that we have since the G7 of “brotherly” meetings, I have the feeling that they wanted to show the rest of the world, among other things, the difference between Western organizations, open, friendly, united, and BRICS, for example, or the meeting of countries bordering the Caspian Sea. Symbolism is beginning to play an increasingly important role.

Radu Magdin: Although we talked about one of the problems, namely Russia, the feeling is that the big problem is still China. Speaking of competition and representation, looking at the calendar for this year and next year in key organisations we see a very active Germany in the G7, an Indonesia that is not yet as active and it will be very interesting to watch the Indian presidency of the G20 next year, because India has given a valve to Russia.

The impression that the developing world has given was that they are not meddling, perhaps somewhat in the same way that we have looked at various crises in the world, like the one in Myanmar. There are also perhaps frustrations there or negative historical memories related to countries in the G7 or the Euro-Atlantic club. For such countries it can be an opportunity from an energy point of view. On the one hand it is very good that we have given this signal of unity, but let us not forget that depending on each culture the symbolism of power and interpretation of familiarity, of warmth, as an element of leadership is different.

From the perspective of the Romanian interest, we have taken measures, we have ticked off our objectives of interest, and beyond other discussions our presidential couple looks good, is presentable, and the world has rediscovered Romania as a place to visit, but beyond communication we must also arrange the logistics – for example in Constanta there is a difference between opportunity and blockage.

Claudiu Lucaci: The Russian Federation is parading propaganda – for example the Russians claim to have left the Snake Island as an act of goodwill. But we are talking about images and decisions. What has happened to Romania in these NATO decisions? The increase in NATO’s military presence is one thing, but we heard about the increase in the American presence from President Biden. We are talking about 3,000 military and 2,000 civilians.

How much Europe and how much America on the eastern flank?

Dan Dungaciu: If we look at Romania’s statements after each summit, they were all pretty much in this tone – that we had achieved all our objectives, even if the Black Sea was not mentioned as we would have liked in the final documents, even if the presence was “tailord” for us and “enhanced” for others – we were happy with all NATO decisions. This time, however, there is cause for satisfaction, and I think it is justified – how many more wars do the Russians have to fight in the Black Sea to make it clear that the war is happening here, in the Black Sea, not in the Baltic Sea, so it is very good that the Black Sea is mentioned in the concept, even after the Western Balkans, and that the Eastern Flank benefits from a more substantial presence. Although the US presence in Romania remains rotational, no further steps have been taken towards the creation of genuine ‘military bases’ in the region on the Eastern Flank. It is in Poland more of a permanent presence than on the rest of the Eastern Flank. But for now we don’t know what the actual presence will be, how many brigades and how many troops will actually be present, there is talk of brigades “assigned” to the East, but not necessarily sent there – so they will stay in the West but do exercises on the Eastern Fringe.

There has really been a shift to a new philosophy of defence in a deterrent posture, now tens of thousands of troops will be able to be mobilised, at least in theory. The number of NATO forces will increase from 40,000 to over 300,000. Some of this will be ready in ten days, the rest in 30. Some units will be pre-assigned to potential hot zones, so you will have troops ready to go into combat if necessary. Some countries are already committing forces. Others are pledging, however everything will have to be discussed and negotiated next year. Perhaps not everyone in Eastern Europe will be very happy about the actual military presence on their territory. The difference between troops “deidicated” to the East and those “relocated” there exists. So we don’t have all the details yet, and in concrete terms we may not have a decisive physical presence, but the important thing is that the philosophy has changed, which is to be welcomed, even if we don’t have the concrete figures yet.

The second important question about what will happen with Romania is the question that we still do not have an answer to: what will be the share of allied presence in Romania and on the Eastern Flank? How many Americans and how many Europeans will there be? Britain’s new chief of staff said very interestingly in a recent public speech that the allies should distribute their tasks, that is, we Europeans should take care of the Eastern Flank and the relationship with the Russian Federation so that the Americans can pivot to Asia. If that happens, then we should be prepared, because things will change in our area – more European presence, probably less American presence, because the American interest will go to the Pacific. But we don’t have the answer to that yet. But the choice is clear – either the Euro-Atlanticists stay together in the Black Sea and go together to the Pacific, or they share the burden. It is not a question of a total disappearance of the Americans, but a question of emphasis is important. Germany and France might be more active in our area and on the Eastern Flank, at least for France it would be a first. So this will be a challenge – not necessarily in a bad way – to which we will have to find the most appropriate response.

Radu Magdin: Very often we have only understood China in terms of the “Asian century”, but in Eastern Europe we will probably rediscover Japan in the next decade, but we also need to talk about India. There is a competition between China – Japan – India, and this competition will intensify, because they are allies in terms of the importance of their continent, but this does not mean that they have the same interests.

Although Obama is talked about as the one who started the pivot to Asia, it seems however that as early as 2005-2006 in Bush’s second term in the US the transition to Asia was de facto being prepared.

We, on the other hand, have operated in simple terms in the public space, including as a signal of leadership. For example, in the interwar period we were economically coupled to Germany, but politically to France and Britain. Now, on the top 5 investors in Romania we have Germany, Austria (which probably if it didn’t have Petrom would be lower in the ranking), France, Italy and the US on 5. The perception sometimes in Romanian politics has been that, yes, we are strategic partners with the Americans and we play with the Americans in the region, but there was the feeling that we were working with the US and Germany, now there is a growing feeling perhaps of the US and France.

We will stay in the American area, but in the future there may be things that will seem strange in the economic market, for the reason that the regional economy, the reconstruction of Ukraine will pose problems, things are rebuilding. The Ukrainians are clearly saying that they are in the triangle with Great Britain and Poland, we are signalling that we are in the rectangle with Germany, France and Italy.

These things are not mere details, if we look carefully at the financial flows, the investments, the way we understand our national interest, these are things that will have to be clarified. We can do with the Anglo-Saxons what Hungary did with the Russians and the Chinese, which is to be a hub for financial flows in the region. If we do that we can also have industrial capacities and work with the Germans, the French and the Italians, but we can also capitalise on certain projects. But here we need a vision that unfortunately we don’t have.

Dan Dungaciu: There is this issue in Romania that we always want to avoid, like “who do you love more, mom or dad”, that is America or Europe. Beyond the political discourse, some issues have changed in perception – if in the 90s, rightly, the security issue was prevalent and the pro-American option was greater than the pro-European one, now we see that things are changing, especially when we talk about “white collars” and “blue collars”. The “white collars”, those actively involved in the financial world, corporations, business, tend to be more pro-European than pro-American. More pro-American are the blue-collar and older population. There is a mutation in Romanian society depending on where money meets in the economy – the “white collars” meet European money, not American money. The lack of American presence in business is a consequence we see even in public perception.

Secondly, the security issue, until the war in Ukraine, didn’t put so much pressure, people took security for granted. How things stand now, whether security is changing views about Europe and the US, we will see in the Security Barometer that ISPRI and LARICS will present in September-October.

If America eventually pivots to Asia, this will be a global strategic decision with consequences for us too. The American departure won’t be “all-out”, it won’t look like a “Aurelian withdrawal”, but there will probably still be an empty space that will have to be filled by someone. And these actors with an economic presence are likely to strengthen their strategic, political or other presence. And Romanian society and political leadership will have to be prepared for this. Including here the NATO summit can be an interesting challenge not only on the security dimension, but on the societal-political dimension. As for the links with the Anglo-Saxon world, if we have not managed to better articulate the economic dimension of the strategic partnership with America, it will be very difficult now, even if there are some good energy signs. It will be very good if we manage to be that hub that Mr Magdin was talking about, but unlikely at the way things are moving.

Attention management and the issue of risk

Radu Magdin: It’s also about attention management. You have to understand that in major capitals you pay for attention, as Poland and Hungary did in Washington, and the room for manoeuvre for their attention is very low, the more important you are the more people knock on your door. Then it’s also a question of importance, but also of language – what am I asking for in those 5 minutes I have? I don’t have to come just to welcome the importance of the meeting, I have to come with a draft, an actual proposal. We could do a lot of things based on our tactical nature, but it needs sophistication and objectives.

Claudiu Lucaci: A recent survey showed that many managers globally are now investing in risk management. In Romania there doesn’t seem to be much emphasis on this type of management. Let’s look at the risks here, not commercial or economic risks, but strategic issues – natural gas, energy, food, military, other resources (rare metals for example).

Dan Dungaciu: The word risk is fundamental here, we have to understand that periods like this of change, of repositioning, are periods more with questions than answers. We don’t have answers to these questions, which is why we are obsessed with risk, if we look at the G7 meeting of the richest democracies, for example. But if we draw the line we have a moment of peplexity, because the people in the G7 seemed to be very unclear about what they are doing – they want to win the war in Ukraine, but neither are participating in it, they want to make capitalism, but put global energy taxes, they want to encourage fossil fuel divestment, but they want to cap and reduce the price of oil and gas. How can you have both at the same time?

One thing they’ve achieved there – reduce gold exports from the Russian Federation, which was only about 6% of the amount of oil and gas they exported, and 90% of that gold was going to the UK. So basically, if you get that, you take London out of the gold market and give it to an…Asian. So even the G7 don’t have very clear answers, nor does the EU have firm answers, nor do the leaders on Ukraine etc.

And on energy – Russia now sells to Europe a little but at high prices and sells to Asia a lot and cheaply, almost at dumping prices, and many in Asia are reselling to Europe oil taken from the Russians. Russia is recalibrating. The necessary pipelines from Russia to Asia do not now exist, but that does not mean they cannot be made. I’m not saying it’s right or wrong, but if we give it up we are replenishing Asia with Russian hydrocarbons. Sure, and Europe can recalibrate to Africa, the Middle East, but it won’t be in the short term. Until then we give a chance of development to Asia which thinks in terms of the 21st century as the Asian century, and here we’re not just talking about China, but also India, Singapore, ASEAN, many countries that want to take their revenge on the West – not that they hate it, but they don’t love it.

So we’re helping all those countries hook up to cheap energy, we’re cutting exports from China that will go to Asia, we’re making Russia more dependent on China and India and Asia, and at the same time we’re saying Kissinger is a lame old man when he says don’t tie Russia to China too tightly, because in the long run that’s going to be our problem, because the West is losing this battle. We say that he is soft, but what are we going to do when this Asian colossus like ASEAN, which is now behaving rather like Ukraine, Belarus and the Republic of Moldova – the smart calf eats from two cows – caught between the security given by the Americans and the welfare given by China, which for the time being are in the balance, how will they eventually decide? Australia has decided – through a government that has since collapsed, with a more pragmatic one taking its place – security over welfare. ASEAN wants to be with neither China nor the US, but we are helping them to engage with Russia and China. We will have very big political problems to recalibrate economically, and strategically speaking the advantages will be on the side of Asia, China, India, those who are now buying Russia’s hydrocarbons, Russia will become more and more dependent on them.

This is a strategic decision and the NATO and G7 summits must be placed in this context, because the risks are now high, we do not know where we are going, but there is a confrontation that we must be aware of. At stake is the position of the West in the world.

The West hopefully remains at the level of global presence it has today, but the future is uncertain, we are giving ammunition to the Sino-Russian partnership, we are giving fuel and energy to an Asia that is becoming more and more proud and wants to take its revenge – so this is the big risk for the West, the rest seem like regional details.

The anti-Kissinger moment: coupling Russia to China

Claudiu Lucaci: So is China the main threat or Asian countries or Russia?

Photo: US diplomat Henry Kissinger with Chinese leader Mao during a secret visit to China in 1971.

Radu Magdin: If we look at things very realpolitik, if we detach ourselves from ideology, the world is changing fast. Maybe Putin would have hoped in his analysis that we would give him a chance by observing in our analysis that by decoupling from them we accelerate exactly what we are trying to prevent – the Asian century. His analysis was wrong however, because of the violence of the invasion it seems that those in the West who would still want to do business with Putin were not given the chance to keep up appearances. They underestimated us and we underestimated them and we are in a situation where, depending also on global dynamics, maybe a solution will be sought after the summer break or they will all lose. It’s hard to believe anyone has a plan, the fear is that we are in a prolonged zone of uncertainty.

Claudiu Lucaci: Maybe all the outfits at the summit, the hugs and so on actually want to convey that – for now we can’t tell you how firm we are, but we can tell you how united we are. As it says here, is it possible that Russia was therefore like a poker player who wants to bluff, being aware that the other player does not want a third player to win the game, and now, because of the violence of the invasion and the public pressure, the other player has no way of giving in either, and now they both lose? Because in reality neither of them would want to break away from the other, neither Russia from Europe, nor Europe from Russia? And now we have another winner, the one sitting on the sidelines, like China or other Asian countries?

Dan Dungaciu: There is a remarkable book by an Australian historian, Christopher Clark, called “The Sleepwalkers”, about how Europe entered the First World War. It shows us that there are precedents in history when no leader wanted to start a war, but they were all convinced that what they were doing was inevitable and they started the First World War. Now we’ve gone a bit sleepwalking ourselves. We each hoped the other’s rationality would stop him – can’t you see we’re both doing ourselves harm? But the trouble is, from one point on you can’t go back. So if these things go all the way, the coupling of Russia to China, then you can’t go back and when you draw the line you don’t know who the winner is, apart from Asia and primarily China.

The consequences could be hard to manage. And going back to Kissinger, who said that the worst thing would be a partnership between Russia and China not just on paper, but in reality, which poses problems for the functioning of the West in terms of its presence in the global world. We should be aware that we are now playing up the West’s presence in the global world.

Claudiu Lucaci: Let’s remember what BRICS and the world further east represents. That world is the one that gives us the resources, and if it ends up putting conditions on us, the West ends up being “someone’s tenant” on the idea that the master of those resources will dictate. Are we heading towards that or not? And what is that “point of no return”?

Radu Magdin: A line from a book, “The Leopard”, says that in order for things to stay the same, everything has to change. And the West now has to recalibrate. We have moral ascendancy, then we pay a price and go all the way. If that’s the essence of my power, I go all the way. Russia, by going too far, gave us no choice – either we were weak or we lost all moral ascendancy. But what do we do now with BRICS? Do we argue with Bolsonaro or not? Do we talk to the Saudis or not?

So it’s either that or we become pragmatic or cynical, and Kissinger knows what he’s talking about when he talks about Russia and China, because he helped win the Cold War by decoupling the two. Now he says – be careful not to do a reverse-Kissinger.

We’re entering a gray world where we have a chance to play

Dan Dungaciu: Black and white are not the favourite colours for politicians and analysts these days. The idea that the world is divided into democracies and non-democracies is a rather risky and unworkable idea – for example, to get rid of energy dependence on a “non-democracy” like Russia, the solution is to couple ourselves to “democracies” like Venezuela or Iran! Just one example. So black and white are not operable in the world we are heading for.

The world is entering into a pragmatism of realignment where everyone plays their own game. The idea has been raised that some states are trying to become hubs for someone else, i.e. to build up their own utility value. In this world, the game has to come from this perspective – what use value will you have? Although Romania seems too small for games, it is exactly in this period that you have to play to find a role of use. Remembering Kissinger, China and Russia, however small a role Romania played then, it played it then. Nixon in 1967 was in Romania, came back in 1969. Ceaușescu, who was in the US in 1970 and 1973, was publicly thanked for what he did for US-China relations. It was a success, beyond all other considerations.

Today, in theory, just as Romania can position itself at equal distance between the Americans and Europe and be credible, in the future, who knows, it could position itself at equal distance between the Asians and the Europeans and still be credible. This is a game we can try – with China and the West, if you set your mind to it, you can be halfway there.

Claudiu Lucaci: With the implicit quotation marks, we could say that Romania is doomed. From my point of view, in a decade, this perspective seems impossible. Our doom is not from today, but from about 20 years ago. We are doomed from the perspective of the way the leaders have built the profile of the country to be in a zone of those who follow the decision makers. If we want to compare things, we can look at Hungary – and it might be more balanced between West and East, but it is worse off with the West. This wisdom of being in between doesn’t really work. Hungary is showing that it’s a bit difficult. And it’s been doing this for about 10 years, so for us to start building this now seems unworkable.

It is obvious that our role is minor in global decision making, but how do we stand out so as to make more of the different opportunities than others, as long as Romanian politicians, our leaders, are condemned to think in the paradigm they have been given either by elections or by their ideological positioning in front of the public?

Radu Magdin: Through information and ideas. We already give information, through diplomacy, the services and the army, and it is good, it is a channel of credibility. Ideas, if we assume. It’s about assumption here, because ideas can come here. But there is room for optimism here. But the signal comes from the top, if it comes. This country may have resources at home and in the diaspora that are untapped. As probabilities go, we’re not doing well. As for potential, once a goal is set, we’re doing well, we can.

Dan Dungaciu: Looking back, certainly Romania’s performance was not very spectacular. But we are in a different logic. It’s like the scene in The Godfather with the peacetime advisors and the wartime advisors. The “peace” is over, it’s true that Romania has been medicalized, has not achieved anything to its true dimensions, not even regionally, but now the “war” has come, not just the one in Ukraine, worlds are changing. When the war comes, you think differently, you have to think differently. Short-term level, intuition, are the qualities of this area, which does not excel in constancy, in long-term projects. So if you think differently, the opportunity is there. It’s a lot harder to get out of line when all the things are in place, but now there’s an opportunity, you can play a card if you want to play it. But first you have to realise that things are a bit different and we have to move a bit differently. The latest strategic moves have fuelled the ‘grey’ area, which is an area of potential.

Claudiu Lucaci: The grey area is the one that brings high potential, that creates opportunities, but we don’t seem to be speculative. I am not against the above idea, I support it, but it seems that we Romanians have not been speculative.

Dan Dungaciu: In this area, we do not create the context. The big ones make the contexts and, as Mircea Malița said, “we have to learn geopolitics so that we understand what can happen to us”. The big states make geopolitics, we learn it. When the tectonic plates move, it depends on where you sit. Romania is entering that period. Of course God gives you, but he doesn’t put it in your bag, we have to be aware that something is changing and we have to change too.

Mr Claudiu Lucaci thanks the organisers, the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian Academy (ISPRI), the Laboratory for Analysis of Information Warfare and Strategic Communication (LARICS) and the German Marshall Fund Romania (GMF Romania).

LARICS project supported by GMF.

Photo: Claudiu Lucaci (strategic communication expert), Dan Dungaciu (Director ISPRI), Radu Magdin (Director Smartlink Communications)

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